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Abstract
We propose a new computational model for the resolution of metonymies, a particular type of
figurative language. Typically, metonymies are considered as a violation of semantic constraints
(e.g., those expressed by selectional restrictions) that require some repair mechanism (e.g., type
coercion) for proper interpretation. We reject this view, arguing that it misses out on the interpretation
of a considerable number of utterances. Instead, we treat literal and figurative language on a
par, by computing both kinds of interpretation independently from each other as long as their
semantic representation structures are consistent with the underlying knowledge representation
structures of the domain of discourse. The following general heuristic principles apply for making
reasonable selections from the emerging readings. We argue that the embedding of utterances
in a coherent discourse context is as important for recognizing and interpreting metonymic
utterances as intrasentential semantic constraints. Therefore, in our approach, (metonymic or literal)
interpretations that establish referential cohesion are preferred over ones that do not. In addition,
metonymic interpretations that conform to a metonymy schema are preferred over metonymic ones
that do not, and metonymic interpretations that are in conformance with knowledge-based aptness
conditions are preferred over metonymic ones that are not. We lend further credit to our model by
discussing empirical data from an evaluation study which highlights the importance of the discourse
embedding of metonymy interpretation for both anaphora and metonymy resolution.  2001 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Metonymy is a phenomenon in natural language, which is usually defined as a figure of
speech in which the speaker is “using one entity to refer to another that is related to it.”
[35, p. 35]. 1 This can be illustrated by the following examples:
(1) “The ham sandwich is waiting to pay.”
(2) “He read Shakespeare.”
In Example (1), it is not the ham sandwich that is waiting, but the person who ordered
it. In Example (2), it is not the person named ‘Shakespeare’ who is being read, but the
works, plays or poems written by him (see Lakoff and Johnson [35] or Fass [18] for many
more similar examples). Metonymy poses a serious problem for semantic analysis both
in terms of recognition and interpretation, i.e., uncovering the implicit lexico-semantic
or conceptual relationships in the metonymic utterance. In Example (1) “the person who
ordered (the ham sandwich)” and in Example (2) “the works, plays or poems written by
(Shakespeare)” have to be recovered to interpret the sentences correctly.
When it comes to the computation of metonymies, researchers usually assume some
a priori lexical or conceptual specification as a reflection of canonical usage patterns
of lexical items—characterizing their literal meaning—relative to which a metonymic
usage has to be determined. It is then a commonly held view in the field of metonymy
resolution to consider semantic restrictions that predicates (especially verbs) impose on
their arguments as a valid indicator to recognize metonymies [18,30,44]. In the examples
above these predicate-argument restrictions require, e.g., the subject of “wait” to be a
PERSON and the direct object of “read” to be a kind of DOCUMENT. 2 The prevailing
computational scheme for dealing with metonymies can then be summarized in the
following way: Only after selectional restriction violations (SRVs) have been encountered,
metonymy resolution is triggered; in all other cases, the literal reading is preferred, by
default.
We will present arguments that this SRV-based approach is neither sufficient for the
recognition of metonymies (i.e., there exist metonymies which do not violate selectional
restrictions), nor are SRVs always indicative of metonymic usage. Our first major claim can
then be summarized as follows. We reject the assumption that metonymic language stands
for a deviation from language norms and instead propose a mechanism which computes
literal and metonymic interpretations independently from SRVs. 3
The second major claim we make relates to the discourse embedding of metonymies.
Almost all approaches to metonymy processing focus on intrasentential analysis. In our
1 We will not discuss problems associated with the lack of precision of this definition; cf. [26].
2 Some researchers refer to these predicate-argument restrictions as selectional restrictions, e.g., Fass [18],
others call them sortal constraints (Harabagiu [29]). We shall use the term ‘selectional restriction’ to characterize
any semantic constraint on argument positions of a predicate related to its lexical or conceptual specification (e.g.,
in terms of the proper agent or patient of a verb).
3 Of course we are not the first researchers to have noticed that figurative language is not always indicated by
SRVs. But whereas some theoretical linguists, e.g., Ortony [43], have also made this point, the computational
approaches to metonymy still focus on SRVs. A more detailed discussion of these claims is presented in
Section 2.1.
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data, however, we found a significant number of metonymies which can only be resolved
through intersentential analysis, i.e., by incorporating criteria of textual cohesion. This has
immediate implications for the resolution of nominal anaphora, since it indicates a strong
interdependence between both types of referential language phenomena, which has not
been focused on so far.
It should be evident from this discussion that treating literal and metonymic interpreta-
tions on a par and incorporating readings originating from the discourse level opens up the
box of Pandora, i.e., we allow a possibly large number of ambiguities to arise. We therefore
introduce a few general heuristic principles by which alternative readings can be ranked on
a preference scale. These principles incorporate criteria that relate to referential success,
conventionality and aptness of a metonymy, as well as intrasentential semantic constraints.
We will show that the integration of all these criteria is really mandatory for the adequate
treatment of metonymies and literal readings.
One might, finally, concede that metonymies constitute a challenging semantic phenom-
enon per se but still question the necessity to deal with a possibly exotic phenomenon
in ‘real’ natural language systems. The contrary is true. Stallard [53] reports on a 27%
performance improvement when metonymy resolution is incorporated into a question-
answering system about airline reservations. Kamei and Wakao [33] argue for the necessity
of metonymy resolution for machine translation. We found metonymic expressions in 15%
of the utterances in a German language corpus of information technology test reports [38].
Even for language engineering tasks, metonymy resolution is a sheer necessity as evi-
denced by a named entity recognition problem in the British National Corpus (BNC). 4 In
a small-scale experiment we found, e.g., that approximately 50% of 100 randomly drawn
occurrences of “BMW” referred metonymically to cars or motorcycles, while the other half
referred literally to the company. The interdependence of anaphora and metonymy resolu-
tion is obvious in everyday language use, e.g., “The treaty has to be signed by the American
government. The United States announced . . .”. Therefore any information extraction sys-
tem wanting to extract, e.g., all the activities of the American government has to recognize
the metonymy in the second sentence.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we elaborate on
the claims made above by considering the relation between metonymies and SRVs
(Section 2.1), their embedding into a larger discourse context (Section 2.2), and the need
for a comprehensive integration of metonymy resolution criteria, including principles for
the heuristic ranking of literal and metonymic readings (Section 2.3). In Section 3 we
introduce the basic knowledge representation requirements of our approach. We start with
the knowledge representation schema in Section 3.1, and then turn to the fundamental
search procedure, the Path Finder, which computes literal and metonymic readings on
a par (Section 3.2). In Section 3.3 several criteria are proposed to distinguish literal and
metonymic readings by means of a so-called Path Classifier. Section 4 deals with
the discourse embedding of metonymies. After a discussion of how (nominal) anaphora and
metonymies interact (Section 4.1), we formalize these interactions (Section 4.2) and turn to
the discourse constraints by which reasonable interpretations can be ranked, resulting in a
4 The BNC is a 100 million word corpus of contemporary British English including a wide variety of domains
and genres (http://www.info.ox.ac.uk:80/bnc).
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summary of our metonymy resolution algorithm (Section 4.3). In Section 4.4 this algorithm
is adapted to an incremental processing mode. Section 5 is devoted to the evaluation of our
approach. We discuss occurrence data of the various linguistic phenomena (Section 5.1), as
well as the resolution rates we achieve with our approach (Section 5.2). Section 6 contains
a discussion of related work. Finally, in Section 7 we point out some shortcomings of our
solutions and propose extensions.
2. Major claims for metonymy resolution
In the following, we will substantiate the claims sketched in the introduction and show
how they differ from assumptions made in previous work on metonymies.
2.1. Metonymies and selectional restrictions
The majority of approaches to metonymy resolution use the violation of selectional
restrictions as a defining property for metonymies: 5
“Predicates impose constraints on their arguments that are often violated. When they
are violated, the arguments must be coerced into something related that satisfies the
constraints. This is the process of metonymy resolution.” (Hobbs et al. [30, p. 79])
“Type coercion: A semantic operation that converts an argument to the type that is
expected by a function, where it would otherwise result in a type error.”
(Pustejovsky [44, p. 425])
We fundamentally disagree with this view and argue instead that a computational
approach to metonymy recognition relying merely on constraint violations has serious
drawbacks regarding coverage and methodological cleanliness. 6
Metonymies without SRVs. Metonymies can occur without necessarily causing SRVs as
illustrated by Examples (3) and (4):
(3) A: “[. . .] First of all, anybody like Johnson, better than Shakespeare?”
B: “I do.”
A: “You do. Why?”
B: “Just cos erm, I don’t really like Shakespeare.”
(Author-for-Document metonymy, BNC)
5 Pustejovsky [44] also considers syntactic type violations but concentrates, nevertheless, on local semantic or
syntactic predicate-argument restrictions.
6 There are also arguments against the cognitive plausibility of an approach where figurative readings are
considered only after literal readings have been rejected because they violate semantic restrictions (for overviews,
cf. [21,22]). Such considerations that, indeed, played a role for the design of the metonymy resolution procedure
we propose will not be discussed in this article (cf. [25]).
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(4) “Je vis alors tomber le papillon. [. . .] Je me suis dit: Semblable est mon destin.
[. . .] Comme ce ver, j’ai rampé dans la fange.”
(“I saw this butterfly fall. I said to myself: Similar is my destiny. [. . .]
Like this caterpillar I have crawled around in the mud.”)
(Caterpillar-for-Butterfly metonymy, from a text by Zola, quoted
by Bonhomme [3, p. 185])
Therefore, SRVs cannot be taken as a defining characteristic for metonymies. One layer
of indeterminacy comes in as verbs such as “like”, “put”, “convince” do not impose
particularly severe restrictions on the types of their arguments (cf. [49] for a measure
of the strength of selectional restrictions). Such soft selectional restrictions often lack
reliable clues on literal and metonymic readings of the arguments of the verb (see Example
(3)). Therefore, all approaches relying on SRVs as a triggering condition for metonymy
recognition miss out the interpretation of some metonymies at least, thereby lowering
recall. An empirical evaluation of this claim will be provided in Section 5.1.
In those cases where previous work acknowledges that metonymies without SRVs exist
(e.g., [18]), the violation criterion is nevertheless used as a simple and ‘neat’ trigger for
recognizing at least the majority of metonymies. The following discussion will challenge
this claim, too.
Direct versus indirect semantic constraints. It is often not clearly stated which sorts of
semantic constraints are covered by a particular metonymy resolution algorithm. Some
authors use mainly restrictions verbs impose on their arguments and state this clearly—
e.g., Fass [17] who explores these as well as adjective-noun constructions only, or Amghar
et al. [1]. Of course, other kinds of predicate-argument restrictions may also be relevant,
e.g., restrictions of nouns on their modifying prepositional phrases. Approaches covering
these restrictions (e.g., [30]) include a greater variety of metonymies. But there are still
more complex semantic restrictions than local predicate-argument restrictions, which we
will call indirect semantic constraints.
In Example (5), 7 the subject “Quantum”—the name of a company—does not immedi-
ately violate a verb restriction as companies can achieve goals. 8 But there is an indirect
violation between the two arguments of the verb as companies cannot achieve certain ac-
cess times.
(5) “In der Leistung konnte die LPS 105 ebenfalls weitestgehend überzeugen.
Laut Core-Test2.8. erreicht die Quantum eine mittlere Zugriffszeit von
16.5 ms, [. . .].”
(“The performance of the LPS 105 [known to be a hard disk developed
by Quantum, K.M. & U.H.] was mostly convincing. According to Core-
Test2.8, the Quantum achieves an average access time of 16.5 ms, [. . .]”)
7 German examples are taken from one of our two application domains, viz. test reports from the information
technology domain. Their translation into English will maintain the original German word order only when it is
necessary for the understanding of the metonymy.
8 Note that the use of the definite determiner with company names in German does not indicate a metonymic
meaning, but is used with the literal meaning as well.
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(From H. Lengner, “Festplatten von 80 MB bis 120 MB: Quantum ProDrive
LPS 105AT.”, PC Praxis, Vol. 1, 1992, p. 54)
Recognizing these and even more complex violations (e.g., ones mediated by subordi-
nate clauses) requires a quite sophisticated metonymy resolution and semantic interpre-
tation procedure. Also, it is usually hard to tell whether indirect semantic constraints are
violated—an issue normally not addressed in previous work. Often not only subject and
(in)direct objects, but all arguments and possibly some adjuncts of the verb have to be
taken into account—in Example (6), the subject and the object of the verb seem to point
to a violation (and thus to a metonymic reading of “the Quantum”), but the sentence-final
prepositional phrase “with its product” readjusts a literal reading interpretation.
(6) “According to CoreTest2.8, the Quantum achieves an average access time
of 16.5 ms with its product.”
These problems are crucial for incremental approaches to metonymy resolution as the
relevant semantic information might not be available when metonymy recognition takes
place.
In the following, the notion of semantic constraints will include both direct semantic
constraints (called predicate-argument constraints or selectional restrictions, interchange-
ably), and indirect semantic constraints. With the term SRV, we refer to the violation of
direct constraints only.
SRVs pointing to non-metonymic readings. Even if SRVs occur, they may also give rise
to non-metonymic readings. One example are metaphoric readings of the verb instead of
metonymic ones of the noun phrase. For instance, a verb like “wait” restricts its subject
fairly clearly to instances of the concept class PERSON (see also the senses of “wait” in
WORDNET [19]), giving rise to explanations of the metonymic reading of “sandwich” in
Example (1). But Example (7) shows that there are still other reasonable interpretations for
non-human subjects, too.
(7) “Upstairs Henry [. . .] pulled his pyjamas on. His purple horrors, were neatly
laid out on a chair again [. . .], but the tight buttonless shirt had been replaced
by a new one. [. . .] His mother was infuriating but she cared about him, deep
down. All the time he’d been going on about the buttons popping off, this
shirt had been up here, waiting for him.” (BNC)
In this example, the preceding context indicates that the shirt is indeed a shirt, thus
precluding a metonymic reading of ‘a person wearing a shirt’. Instead “wait” is used
metaphorically. We do not handle metaphors in our approach, although we will discuss
it as a possible extension of our work in Section 7.
Moreover, SRVs interact heavily with the way how restrictions are encoded. Therefore,
violation judgments are dependent on the specification depth of the underlying knowledge
base or lexicon—the flatter it is, the less likely are violations to be detected because the
relevant fine-grained distinctions cannot be expressed. So, the granularity of knowledge
specifications becomes an issue for metonymy resolution, too (see also [4]). Although this
is in some sense true for any specification of semantic or conceptual knowledge and cannot
be fully avoided, metonymy resolution algorithms should provide safeguards to deal with
systematic granularity problems, but rarely do so.
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2.2. Metonymies and the discourse context
Previous approaches to metonymy resolution usually disregard the broader discourse
context. This neglect is obviously rooted in the assumption that if metonymies are
so easily recognized via selectional restrictions within the sentence, then the context
spanned between several sentences might not be relevant for recognition. But what is
more, discourse context even does not play a role during the interpretation phase—
one notable exception being [37]. The interpretation phase normally capitalizes on local
selectional restrictions, together with some knowledge about the metonymic expression
(and perhaps knowledge about conventions for metonymic usage). We argue instead that
the discourse embedding of metonymic expressions is often crucial for both recognition
and interpretation.
Firstly, as Examples (4) and (5) reveal, the discourse context often allows to recog-
nize metonymies even if there are no or only indirect intrasentential clues. In both ex-
amples the preceding sentence(s) have as a current local focus a butterfly (not a cater-
pillar) or a hard disk (not a company), with which the metonymic noun phrases un-
der scrutiny corefer. Interpreting the noun phrases metonymically regardless of SRVs
allows to establish referential cohesion in a straightforward way, which is not true for
the literal reading. In Example (4), metonymy recognition is fully dependent on the
previous context, since no clue for a metonymic reading is available within the sen-
tence.
Secondly, Examples (4) and (5) suggest that anaphora resolution is dependent on
prior metonymy resolution for making the proper referent accessible. In Example (5),
“Quantum”, the name of a company, cannot be resolved as being coreferent to “LPS105”,
a hard disk, without prior metonymy resolution. If it is not available, the anaphor
resolution will fail and the discourse representation will appear incoherent, though the
actual discourse is not.
Thirdly, when choosing between different metonymic readings those which establish
referential cohesion should often be preferred over ones that do not. In Examples (8) and
(9) the selectional restriction of “buy” is strong enough to signal a metonymic reading for
“the Shakespeare”, but not strong enough to indicate what it is metonymic for. A solution
to this problem depends on the context—in Example (8) the (conventional) reading
Shakespeare-for-Play would be preferred, whereas in Example (9) the reading
Shakespeare-for-Bust is most likely. The latter example indicates how discourse-
rooted referential preferences can override the preference for conventional metonymic
readings.
(8) “John could not decide whether to buy the play by Shakespeare or the play
by Goethe. In the end, he bought the Shakespeare.”
(9) “John could not decide whether to buy the bust of Shakespeare or the bust
of Goethe. In the end, he bought the Shakespeare.”
Summarizing our arguments, anaphora and metonymy resolution are often co-dependent.
Hence, we argue for an integrated model that accounts for the systematic interdependencies
between them. Such a model is especially important for (although by no means restricted
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to) incremental approaches to natural language analysis, as semantic violations may not
be recognized at the time when metonymy or anaphora resolution is or should be carried
out.
As a caveat, we concede that anaphora resolution is not always sufficient to overcome
the shortcomings of the SRV approach. This holds especially for non-definite metonymic
noun phrases, whose resolution may require rich world knowledge—in Example (3), e.g.,
the knowledge that the speaker lives in the 20th century and is thus unlikely to talk about
liking the person ‘Shakespeare’.
2.3. Feature integration for metonymy resolution
In the previous two subsections, we focused on two particularly relevant criteria for
metonymy processing, viz. the violation of or conformance with selectional restrictions
at the sentence level and the discourse embedding of metonymy interpretation via the
interactions of nominal anaphora and metonymies. There are, however, additional criteria
one has to consider.
Firstly, any relation between two objects can give rise to a metonymy (cf. Nunberg [41]
and Example (1)). One basic condition, though, is that such a relation is possible at all—
in other words, that the metonymic reading is consistent with the current encoding of the
underlying world knowledge. A metonymy of the type “I read X” (meaning “I read the
works of X”) is precluded if X cannot be an author of a document (e.g., if X is a non-human
animal).
A second well-known property of metonymies is that although, in principle, every rela-
tion can give rise to metonymies, some relations do so especially often and systematically.
Such relations, R, give rise to a metonymy schema of the form X-for-Y, where R holds
between Y and X. So the written-by relation (Example (2)) can be used for any author, giv-
ing rise to an Author-for-Document schema. Typical schemata include Producer-
for-Product (“I parked the BMW outside”), Part-for-Whole (“There are a lot of
good heads in this university”) or Place-for-Institution (“The White House an-
nounced . . .”); lists of schemata can be found, e.g., in Stern [54] and Lakoff and Johnson
[35]. Computational approaches may use schemata to constrain and disambiguate inter-
pretations by preferring schematic and therefore more conventional interpretations over
unconventional ones [1,30].
A third observation relates to the aptness of metonymic interpretations, i.e., the typicality
of the relation between the two objects in question. Regarding, e.g., Part-for-Whole
metonymies, we claim that a more significant (or visible) part of an object is more likely
to stand for the object than a non-significant (invisible) one. Thus, the screen of a TV is
more likely to stand for the TV metonymically than one of its push-bottons (insignificant)
or transistors (invisible from the outside). This issue has been mostly neglected. We have
so far regarded the two properties of typicality and visibility as good indicators of aptness.
One reviewer made the suggestion that the functionality of parts might also be an indicator
of aptness (the screen of a TV being strongly related to the TV’s function). This would
have the advantage that aptness could be explained in terms of the qualia structures of
components. We will briefly touch upon the issue of aptness in Section 4.3, leading to a
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preference of apt metonymies over non-apt ones (for a detailed discussion, cf. Hahn and
Markert [25]).
Some metonymic utterances are even marked at the level of morphosyntax, thus yielding
a fourth set of constraints. Producer-for-Product metonymies, e.g., often require
a definite article in the singular (“I parked the BMW outside”), whereas literal readings
do not (“BMW bought Rover”). 9 These observations can be exploited for metonymy
recognition, but like SRVs they are often non-conclusive as they can apply to literal
readings as well, as is exemplified by “Even the mighty IBM had problems” (BNC). In
addition, these interactions are language-dependent. In German, e.g., the definite article
used with literal PRODUCER readings is much more common than in English.
Finally, language idiosyncracies also have an effect on the preference and possibility
of interpretations. Schemata, e.g., have language-specific gaps. The Animal-for-Meat
schema for the English language, e.g., is normally not applicable to “pig” as the word
“pork” exists [7].
None of the features discussed so far explains metonymic usage alone. Even a strength-
based ranking of criteria has to be evaluated carefully, since they can override each other.
So, e.g., extremely unconventional metonymies can be made plausible in a suitable context,
or language-specific idiosyncracies might override all other, usually stronger constraints in
some cases. We claim that an adequate model of metonymy resolution should take all
of these features into account. We present here an integrated model, using five of them,
namely, world knowledge, intrasentential semantic constraints, discourse embedding,
schematization and aptness constraints, with emphasis on the first three of them. We
disregard morphosyntactic evidence and language-specific lexical idiosyncracies. This
reflects our intention to propose a largely language-independent model of metonymy
processing. We are, however, aware of the fact that this limited model needs to be
supplemented by language-dependent criteria. In summary, the following principles
characterize our model:
• Principle 1. All literal and metonymic interpretations must be consistent with the
available knowledge representation structures as a formal model of a given domain
(so-called world knowledge). In the case of metonymic interpretations, this requires
the reconstruction of a conceptual relation between the conceptual correlate of
the surface expression and the intended referent. This principle is formalized in
Section 3.2.
• Principle 2. All interpretations must be consistent with the intrasentential context,
especially with applicable selectional restrictions. This does not mean, however,
that a literal interpretation consistent with the intrasentential context is always
preferred over a metonymic one consistent with the intrasentential context (see
Section 3.2).
• Principle 3. Interpretations that establish referential cohesion are preferred over ones
that do not (see Section 4.3).
9 Many more of such phenomena have been discussed, e.g., by Copestake and Briscoe [12] and Pustejovsky
[44].
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• Principle 4. Metonymic interpretations that conform to a schema are preferred
over metonymic ones that do not (see Section 3.3 for the definition of appropriate
schemata).
• Principle 5. Metonymic interpretations that fulfil aptness conditions are preferred over
metonymic ones that do not (see Section 4.3).
For now, we distinguish between principles that hold absolutely (Principles 1 and 2),
i.e., principles that must be fulfilled by every interpretation, and principles that hold
only relatively, i.e., that only express a preference (Principles 3 to 5). Furthermore, there
are principles that hold for literal and metonymic readings (Principles 1, 2 and 3) and
ones that are only applicable to metonymic readings, by definition (Principles 4 and 5).
Obviously, these criteria are not mutually exclusive. Some of the problems arising from
non-exclusiveness can be eliminated by a model of preference rankings (cf. Table 12 in
Section 4.3). This proposal will then be evaluated by considering empirical evidence in
Section 5.
3. Conceptual interpretation
In order to interpret Example (1) one has to know that sandwiches are eaten by humans
who can be agents of waiting; the understanding of Example (2) requires to know that
Shakespeare was a writer and that therefore a relation between him and books (a common
object of reading) is likely; for Example (5) one needs to know that Quantum is a
company producing hard disks. Since metonymies are so deeply rooted in the conceptual
knowledge of some domain, metonymy resolution is here considered as part of the
conceptual interpretation of an utterance. The underlying knowledge about these kinds of
relations, instances and concepts is kept in a knowledge base (see Section 3.1). Conceptual
interpretations, i.e., the identification of relations between concepts and instances, are
computed by a search algorithm—the Path Finder—operating on this knowledge base
(cf. Section 3.2). The distinction whether these interpretations can be considered as literal
or as metonymic is carried out by a path classification algorithm, the Path Classifier
(cf. Section 3.3).
3.1. Representation of conceptual knowledge
We use a KL-ONE-type terminological knowledge representation language (cf. Woods
and Schmolze [60] for a survey) to represent conceptual knowledge of a domain. Since our
application takes texts from the information technology domain as input, we will focus on
concepts and relations from this domain in our examples.
The concept hierarchy of our knowledge base consists of a set of concept names
F = {COMPUTER-SYSTEM, PRINTER, HARD-DISK-DRIVE, . . .} and a subclass relation
F ={(LASER-PRINTER, PRINTER), (PRINTER, PRINTER), (NOTEBOOK, COMPUTER-
SYSTEM), (COMPUTER-SYSTEM, OBJECT), . . .} ⊂ F × F . This relation is both transi-
tive and reflexive. If C F D holds, we call C a subconcept of D and D a superconcept
of C. The intersection of two concepts C and D is written as C D. The set of instance
names is denoted by I , and every instance i is an element of at least one concept C (writ-
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ten as i ∈ C). For every instance i ∈ I the (direct conceptual) class of i is defined by⋂
C∈F ,i∈C C. We express this by class(i)= C or by i inst-of C and call C also the small-
est concept containing i .
The set of relation names R = {Has-Physical-Part,Has-Laser,Clock-Fre−
quency-of ,Produced-by, . . .} contains the labels of all conceptual roles. These are
also organized into a hierarchy by the relation R= {(Has-Laser,Has-Physical-Part),
(Clock-Frequency-of ,Property-of ) . . .} ⊂R×R. The same properties and notions of sub-
relation and superrelation hold as for the concept hierarchy. If the relation R holds be-
tween two instances a and b, the tuple (a, b) is said to be an instance of R (written
as (a, b) ∈ R or aRb). If (a, b) is an instance of R, then a ∈ domain(R) holds, e.g.,
domain(Laser-of )= LASER; b is called a role-filler of R or an element of range(R), e.g.,
range(Laser-of) = LASER-PRINTER. Domain and range restrictions of relations incorpo-
rate selectional restrictions; e.g., the range of the role Agent of the concept WAIT is re-
stricted to PERSON. A relation R is called the inverse of a relation S (written as R = S−1)
iff for every instance (a, b) of S the tuple (b, a) is an instance of R and vice versa. Thus,
Laser-of and Has-Laser are inverses of each other. We may also restrict a relation R to a
concept C, expressed as C |R. This restricted relation contains as instances all (a, b) ∈ R
with a ∈ C; similarly, the range restriction R|C contains all (a, b) ∈R with b ∈ C.
The constructs we use are very common except for two particularities. Firstly, we use
fairly specific relations like, e.g., Has-Laser, which allow the specification of particularly
fine-grained constraints at the concept level. Consider, e.g., cardinality restrictions
associated with the concept LASER-PRINTER. The general relation Has-Part cannot be
restricted to one role filler, whereas the specific relation Has-Laser can. The use of those
rather specific relations is motivated by knowledge engineering requirements emerging
from the host system SYNDIKATE [28] the metonymy resolution module is embedded
in, not by the metonymy resolution task. In effect, the use of very specific relations is
mostly irrelevant for our claims, since metonymies usually address rather general levels of
conceptual constraints.
Secondly, we use relation hierarchies as they are a suitable vehicle to explain
inconsistencies with regard to relation transitivity. So, e.g., it is well-known that the Has-
Part relation is not always transitive [15]. Chaffin [8] considers different subrelations of
Has-Part instead, which are transitive, whereas the general relation is not. We have, by and
large, adopted Chaffin’s relation hierarchy, especially the hierarchy of Has-Part relations
(cf. Table 1), as it is supported by empirical data from psychological experiments and has
been widely acknowledged (it is, e.g., incorporated in WORDNET [19]).
Fig. 1 depicts a fragment of the relation hierarchy from our knowledge base. Relations
are depicted without boxes, domain and range restrictions appear below the corresponding
relation and are marked by D: and R:, respectively. Concepts are indicated by rounded
boxes. The figure also depicts that Has-Part, as well as the two relations Contains and
Made-of, are subrelations of an Includes relation. This is motivated by empirical data from
Chaffin et al. [9]. The Contains relation denotes spatial containment as in BOTTLE—MILK,
the Made-of relation makes explicit the link between an object and its material as in SHEET
OF PAPER—PAPER.
The relation hierarchy will be used to constrain the search for conceptual interpretations
by the Path Finder (although the Path Finder operates without this restriction
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Table 1
Subrelations of Has-Part
Relation Examples
Has-Physical-Part cup–handle, laser printer–laser, tree–trunk
Has-Member forest–tree, firm–manager, soccer team–defender
Has-Portion cake–piece of cake, toner powder–toner particle
Has-Phase shopping–paying, programming–testing
Has-Feature rodeo–cowboy, halloween–masks
Has-Subregion New York–Harlem, desert–oasis
Fig. 1. Has-Part-relations in a concrete knowledge base (IT domain).
as well), and for handling some granularity problems. It also eases the specification
of regularities underlying metonymic relations in the sense that abstract specifications
(e.g., Has-Part) get instantiated by specific relations (e.g., Has-Laser) by the Path
Classifier.
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3.2. Computing interpretations: Path Finder
We associate a lexical item w with a conceptual correlate, w.CON ∈F (e.g., “computer”
is associated with COMPUTER-SYSTEM). If a syntactic link between two lexical items, w
and w′, is to be allowed, the concepts w.CON and w′.CON must be conceptually related. 10
So, for Example (10), the conceptual relatedness of the concepts CPU and COMPUTER-
SYSTEM has to be checked.
(10) “The CPU of the computer.”
In order to determine conceptual relatedness, we employ the Path Finder, an
algorithm which performs an extensive search in the domain knowledge base looking for
series of relations connecting two given concepts (e.g., CPU and COMPUTER-SYSTEM
are connected by a Part-Of relation). The basic algorithm works with domain knowledge
constraints only, but can be supplemented by additional ones, e.g., discourse constraints, if
needed.
Definition 3.1 (Conceptual relatedness). Two concepts C and D, both from F , are
conceptually related iff a well-formed conceptual relation path (short: well-formed path)
exists between C and D. A well-formed path has to be connective and non-cyclic. The set
of well-formed paths between C and D is called P(C,D).
We consider the existence of a well-formed path between the conceptual correlates of
two lexical items in a syntactic relation to be equivalent to a conceptual interpretation of
that syntactic relation.
Connectivity ensures that a relation path between two concepts does not have any
“breaks”:
Definition 3.2 (Connectivity). A series of relations Ri ∈ R (i = 1, . . . , n) and concepts
Cj ∈F (j = 0, . . . , n), n ∈N, is connective or establishes a connective path from C to D
(C,D ∈F) iff:
• Ri is a (possibly inherited) conceptual role of Ci−1, and Ci is the smallest concept in
F with range(Ci−1 |Ri) F Ci , i.e., Ri has the range Ci when restricted to Ci−1 for
all i = 1, . . . , n.
• C0 = C ∧ (Cn F D ∨ D F Cn), i.e., the path begins at C and its end point Cn is
either a subconcept or a superconcept of D. 11
A connective path will be denoted as (C0, R1, C1, R2, . . . ,Rn, Cn) or simply as
(R1, . . . ,Rn). The number n is called the length of the path.
10 For details of our approach to conceptual interpretation from syntactic (dependency) structures, cf. Romacker
et al. [50]. Syntactic links we consider for the purpose of metonymy interpretation include verbs and their
arguments (subjects, objects and PPs), as well as the links between nouns and their pre- or postmodifiers.
11 That the end point Cn is required to be a subconcept or a superconcept of D, and not to be a superconcept of
D only, leads to the following consequence: A connective path from C to D is not necessarily a connective path
from D to C . We circumvent this problem by calling two concepts conceptually related if a path from C to D or
from D to C exists.
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Fig. 2. Path between COMPUTER-SYSTEM and CPU.
Table 2
Non-cyclic paths
Non-Cyclic ((R1 . . . Rn)) : ⇔ ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i = j :
¬∃S ∈R, S = S−1 : ((Ri R S)∧ (Rj R S−1))
An example of a connective path between COMPUTER-SYSTEM and CPU (see Example
(10)) is the path p1 = ( COMPUTER-SYSTEM, Has-Central-Unit, CENTRAL-UNIT, Has-
Motherboard, MOTHERBOARD, Has-Cpu, CPU), which is depicted in Fig. 2.
Furthermore, we require a well-formed path to be non-cyclic.
Definition 3.3 (Cyclic and non-cyclic paths). A connective path (R1, . . . ,Rn) is cyclic iff
it contains two non-identical relations which are inverses to each other or have an inverse
superrelation. Otherwise, the path is called non-cyclic. These requirements are formalized
in Table 2.
The path p2 = (PRINTER, Printer-of, COMPUTER-SYSTEM, Has-Central-Unit,
CENTRAL-UNIT) from PRINTER to CENTRAL-UNIT is connective, but cyclic and there-
fore not well-formed, as Printer-of is a subrelation of Part-of and Has-Central-Unit is a
subrelation of the inverse Has-Part. This criterion favors a unidirectional search in the
knowledge base as cyclic paths often express some similarity between the starting and end
point of a search (e.g., for p2 we may consider a printer and a central unit as parts of the
same computer), as opposed to semantic relatedness (for this distinction, cf. Resnik [48]).
Note that this criterion does not depend on the existence of relation hierarchies. With
no such hierarchies available, it is then reduced to a path not including relations and their
direct inverses. In such a simple model using only a ‘flat’ Has-Part relation, p2 would be
considered as a path of the form (Part-of, Has-Part), while p1 is composed of a series of
Has-Part relations.
A warranted side effect of the cyclicity criterion is that we achieve more independence of
path length criteria for evaluating a connective path (cf., e.g., Norvig [40] for an approach
which relies partly on explicit path length restrictions). A path of length 3, like the one
from COMPUTER-SYSTEM to CPU in Fig. 2, is non-cyclic as it contains only relations of
the type Has-Part, whereas a path of length 2, like the one from PRINTER to CENTRAL-
UNIT, is cyclic. The independence of path length criteria translates directly into a greater
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independence of granularity biases in the knowledge base. If, e.g., Has-Part relations
are specified in great detail, we may easily end up with rather long chains of Has-Part
relations between objects, which nevertheless should not be penalized in comparison to
less developed areas of the knowledge base.
One implicit restriction in Definition 3.2 is not to allow concept specialization during
the search. This becomes clear when we look at Example (5) again, repeated in a shorter
form as Example (11):
(11) “The performance of the LPS105 was mostly convincing. The Quantum
achieves an average access time of 16.5 ms.”
The Path Finder looks for paths between the concepts ACHIEVE and QUANTUM
when interpreting the subject relation between “achieves” and “Quantum”. The path which
mirrors the correct metonymic interpretation, viz. “Quantum” is a Producer-for-
Product metonymy for a hard disk drive, should look something like p := (ACHIEVE,
Achieve-Agent, HARD-DISK-DRIVE, Produced-by, PRODUCER). This path, however, is
not connective as the role filler restriction associated with Achieve-Agent is not as specific
as HARD-DISK-DRIVE, but restricted to OBJECT, in general. OBJECT, however, does not
have a Produced-by role as only instances of PRODUCT have such a role. Specialization
from OBJECT to the more specific concept HARD-DISK-DRIVE is in general not allowed
in the search, simply to avoid combinatorial explosion of the search procedure (imagine
a specialization from OBJECT to all its subconcepts and following up all emanating
relations). At the same time, uncontrolled (i.e., not context-specific) specialization would
be equivalent to making an unsupported hypothesis about the identity of objects (e.g.,
tentatively assume an OBJECT to be a HARD-DISK-DRIVE or any other subclass of
OBJECT) or postulate a metonymic reading not supported by the discourse context. We do,
however, allow specialization to a particular set of concepts made salient in the previous
discourse context. 12 This leads to a refined definition of connectivity:
Definition 3.4 (Extended connectivity). A series of relations Ri ∈ R (i = 1, . . . , n) and
concepts Cj ∈F (j = 0, . . . , n), n ∈N, is connective or establishes a connective path from
C to D (C,D ∈ F) with regard to a concept list (D1, . . . ,Dm) (Dk ∈ F : k = 1, . . . ,m)
iff:
• For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} holds: Ri is a (possibly inherited) conceptual role of Ci−1, and
Ci is the smallest concept in F with range(Ci−1 |Ri)F Ci , or Ri is a conceptual role
of some Dk ∈ (D1, . . . ,Dm) with Dk F Ci−1 and Ci is the smallest concept in F
with range(Dk |Ri)F Ci .
• C0 = C ∧ (Cn F D ∨D F Cn) (see Definition 3.2).
The original Definition 3.2 of connectivity is the same as that of extended connectivity
with regard to the empty concept list. We denote specialization in a path with F . The
path from ACHIEVE to QUANTUM can then be written as (ACHIEVE, Achieve-Agent,
OBJECT, F , HARD-DISK-DRIVE, Produced-by, PRODUCER). It is connective with
12 These concepts are determined and ordered by a centering algorithm [56], an issue not relevant for this
exposition.
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Fig. 3. Path between ACHIEVE and PRODUCER.
regard to any list (D1, . . . ,Dm) containing the concept HARD-DISK-DRIVE and it is
not connective, otherwise. The corresponding path is shown in Fig. 3. 13 The short-hand
notation (R1, . . . ,Rn) ignores concept specialization; so the length of the path is neutral
with respect to concept specialization.
3.3. Distinguishing literal from metonymic interpretations: Path Classifier
The Path Finder computes all well-formed paths between two concepts w.CON and
w′.CON, which correspond to conceptual interpretations of a syntactic relation between w
and w′. It does not distinguish between literal and metonymic readings or choose between
them a priori. The former task is assigned to the Path Classifier. Predefined path
patterns are used to distinguish between a subset LP of all types of well-formed paths
which are labeled “literal”, another subset MP which is labeled “metonymic”, and all
remaining paths UP which are labeled “unclassified”. A literal path between w.CON and
w′.CON mirrors a literal interpretation of both w and w′, whereas a metonymic path
mirrors a metonymic interpretation of w and/or w′. Unclassified paths mirror literal or
metonymic interpretations that cannot be classified with the current path patterns. These
patterns make use of relation transitivity and metonymic schemata. They are defined as
generally as possible to reduce the amount of manual specification. From those general
path patterns and by virtue of the hierarchical organization of conceptual relations, specific
conceptual role chains can be derived by a simple pattern matching algorithm.
13 The picture also shows another path between ACHIEVE and PRODUCER as PRODUCER is also a subconcept
of OBJECT. We will come back to this later in Example (13).
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3.3.1. Literal paths
If both w and w′ are meant literally, w fulfils the selectional restrictions of w′ (the
converse is not necessarily true, see Section 2.1). Then the conceptual correlates of w and
w′ can normally be linked directly via a relation R (e.g., a verb being directly linked to
its subject by an Agent role). On the other hand, if such a direct link exists, local semantic
constraints allow a literal interpretation of both w and w′ (although other interpretations
via longer paths may exist as well and may be preferrable by, e.g., discourse constraints).
Thus, all paths of length 1 are included in LP .
Due to different granularity levels in knowledge bases, a literal usage can also be
intended if no direct link between two conceptual correlates can be found. This holds, in
particular, when the conceptual specifications are fairly detailed. The relational structure,
e.g., between the concepts CPU and COMPUTER-SYSTEM (cf. Example (10)) can be
expressed in many different ways, depending on the intended specificity. Knowledge
base KB1 might specify a Has-Part relation between the two concepts directly (i.e.,
COMPUTER-SYSTEM, Has-Cpu/Has-Part, CPU); alternatively, knowledge base KB2 might
contain a series of Has-Part relations between them, e.g., (COMPUTER-SYSTEM, Has-
Central-Unit, CENTRAL-UNIT, Has-Motherboard, MOTHERBOARD, Has-Cpu, CPU) (see
Fig. 2). In the second case, the path falls short of the ‘length 1’ constraint from above but
still expresses a literal interpretation, though more fine-grained.
In order to accomodate our notion of literalness to this phenomenon we incorporate
empirical observations about the transitivity of relations made by Chaffin [8] and Huhns
and Stephens [31]. As already described in Section 3.1, Chaffin [8] distinguishes between
several subrelations of the general Has-Part relation. He claims that any of these
subrelations are transitive, while the Has-Part superrelation, in general, is not. Thus, a
relation chain containing only relations of one of these subtypes is again a relation of
the same subtype, whereas a relation chain containing several different types of Has-Part
relations does not constitute an admitted Has-Part relation any more. Accordingly, we have
included the path patterns (Has-Physical-Part∗), (Has-Member∗), (Has-Portion∗), (Has-
Phase∗), (Has-Feature∗), (Has-Subregion∗) (cf. Table 1) and the corresponding inverses
like (Physical-Part-of∗) in LP , but exclude (Has-Part∗) from it. The abbreviation (R∗)
for R ∈ R describes every well-formed path (R1, . . . ,Rn) with Ri R R for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We refer to the first six of these patterns as transitive part-whole patterns and
their inverses as transitive whole-part patterns. Compositionality of relation types other
than Has-Part relations has not received that much attention in the literature, one of the
rare exceptions being the study by Huhns and Stephens [31]. Drawing on their results, we
have as yet included (Contains∗), (Contained-by∗) and (Connected-to∗) in LP . The entire
set of literal paths is summarized in Table 3.
As we regard all these paths as literal, all the above-mentioned paths between CPU and
COMPUTER-SYSTEM are literal, too—either because they are of length 1 or instantiate
a transitive part-whole pattern. So, their lexical correlates in Example (10) can receive
a literal interpretation (under these paths), regardless of knowledge base granularity
effects.
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Table 3
Literal paths
Path patterns Comments Path patterns Comments
(R, R ∈R) Paths of length 1
(Has-Physical-Part∗) (Physical-Part-of∗)
(Has-Member∗) (Member-of∗)
(Has-Phase∗) Transitive (Phase-of∗) Transitive
(Has-Feature∗) Part-whole (Feature-of∗) Whole-part
(Has-Portion∗) Patterns (Portion-of∗) Patterns
(Has-Subregion∗) (Subregion-of∗ )
(Connected-to∗ ) Self-inverse role
(Contains∗) (Contained-by∗ )
3.3.2. Metonymic paths
We now assume that w is metonymic for an instance of the concept class B . We also
assume for reasons of simplicity that w′ is literal and will later extend our definition to
other cases.
In order to determine metonymic path patterns consider the conceptual link from
the concept w′ .CON to w.CON. A corresponding well-formed conceptual path p =
(C0,R1,C1, . . . ,Rn,Cn) with n ∈ N, n > 1, Ri ∈ R (i = 1, . . . , n), and Ci ∈ F (i =
0, . . . , n) must, first, link w′.CON = C0 to B via p1 := (R1, . . . ,Rj ) for some j ∈
{1, . . . , n − 1}. The concept B is then linked to Cn (a sub- or superconcept of w.CON)
via p2 := (Rj+1, . . . ,Rn).
The path is therefore divided into two halfs with the ‘breakpoint’ Cj ( = B). As w′ is
literal, p1 ∈ LP must hold, whereas p2, the other half of the path, must characterize the
metonymic relation between B and w.CON. We concentrate here on metonymies referring
to established schemata [18,34] such as Whole-for-Part, Part-for-Whole,
Producer-for-Product, Container-for-Contents, and Material-for-
Object metonymies. The metonymic relations corresponding to these schemata {Part-
of, Has-Part, Produced-by, Contained-by, Made-of} constitute the set MR. If w′
instead of w is metonymic, the inverse relations MR−1 = {Has-Part,Part-of ,Produces,
Contains,Material-of } must be considered. This list of metonymic relations is, of course,
incomplete and can be augmented on demand. Augmenting the list has to be done manually
at the moment. As it only involves adding a further high-level relation name (e.g., Attribute-
of) to the set of metonymic relations, this is no major drawback.
In the case of a Producer-for-Productmetonymy (such as with Example (11)—
“The Quantum achieves . . .”), j = n − 1 and Rn = Produced-by must hold (the full
path reads as p := (ACHIEVE, Achieve-Agent, F , HARD-DISK-DRIVE, Produced-by,
PRODUCER)) (see Fig. 3). For a Part-for-Whole or Whole-for-Part metonymy,
j < n− 1 may be possible, as all transitive part-whole and whole-part patterns (e.g., (Has-
Physical-Part∗)) also express a single Has-Part or Part-of relation (see the explanations
of literal paths in Table 3). For notational convenience, we now consider all transitive
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part-whole and whole-part patterns and all other literal paths as a single relation so that
we may write (Has-Physical-Part∗) R Has-Part ∈MR or (Has-Feature∗) ∈MR. We
summarize these considerations in the definition of metonymic paths below:
Definition 3.5 (Metonymic paths). A well-formed conceptual path p := (C0,R1, . . . ,
Cn−1,Rn,Cn) from w′.CON to w.CON is a (simple and one-sided) metonymic path, iff
it is not literal and j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} exists such that:
(
(R1,R2, . . . ,Rj ) ∈LP ∧ (Rj+1, . . . ,Rn) ∈MR
)
∨ ((Rj+1, . . . ,Rn) ∈ LP ∧ (R1,R2, . . . ,Rj ) ∈MR−1
)
.
In the first case, w is metonymic for an instance in Cj under the interpretation p
(abbreviation: metonymicp(w,Cj )). In the second case, w′ is metonymic for an instance
in Cj under the interpretation p.
This definition captures only those cases where either w or w′ is metonymic, but not
both (“one-sided metonymic path”); it also captures only non-recursive (or “simple”)
metonymies. In recursive metonymies, the underlying referent of w is related via a series
of different relation types to w (see Example (14)).
If w and w′ are both metonymic, then p is composed of three subpaths, viz. p1 ∈
MR−1, p2 ∈ LP and p3 ∈MR. If w is a recursive metonymy and w′ literal, p consists
of two subpaths, p1 ∈ LP and a path p2 /∈MR, /∈ LP , but where p2 can be divided into
a series of paths which are all in MR. Consider the following examples:
• In Example (12), “computer” is a Whole-for-Part metonymy for its processor,
as clock frequency is a property attributed to a processor, not to a computer as such. 14
(12) “The clock-frequency of the computer.”
The syntactic relation between w′ = “clock frequency” and w = “computer” is
checked by searching for a well-formed path between the corresponding con-
cepts CLOCK-FREQUENCY and COMPUTER-SYSTEM. The Path Finder lo-
cates the path (CLOCK-FREQUENCY, Clock-Frequency-of, CPU, Cpu-of, MOTHER-
BOARD, Motherboard-of, CENTRAL-UNIT, Central-Unit-of COMPUTER-SYSTEM),
a metonymic one. With the above notation, n = 4, j = 1, p1 = (R1) = (Clock-fre-
quency-of ) ∈ LP , and p2 = (Cpu-of ,Motherboard-of ,Central-Unit-of )R Part-of
∈MR holds (see also Fig. 2 for path p2). We deduce by this path pattern that
“computer” denotes a Whole-for-Part metonymy for an instance of the concept
CPU = C1.
• In the previous example only a metonymic path between CLOCK-FREQUENCY and
COMPUTER-SYSTEM is found. We do not need to resolve ambiguities between literal
and metonymic readings. If we go back to Example (5) repeated below in a shorter
form, we encounter such a (local) ambiguity between literal and metonymic readings.
(13) “[. . .] the LPS 105 was mostly convincing [. . .]. The Quantum
achieves an average access time of 16.5 ms.”
14 The difference between granularity phenomena and metonymies is not always clear-cut as a comparison with
Example (10) reveals.
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The Path Finder finds two well-formed paths between ACHIEVE and QUAN-
TUM, namely (ACHIEVE, Achieve-Agent, OBJECT) and (ACHIEVE, Achieve-Agent,
OBJECT, F , HARD-DISK-DRIVE, Produced-by, PRODUCER) (see also Fig. 3). The
first has length 1 and is therefore literal. The second is a metonymic path where n= 2
and j = 1 holds. The metonymic relation in question is Produced-by. Hence, “Quan-
tum” can be interpreted as a Producer-for-Productmetonymy for an instance
of the class HARD-DISK-DRIVE.
• Example (14) illustrates a recursive metonymy:
(14) “The clock-frequency of the IBM.”
Here “the IBM” is used metonymically for the processor of a computer developed by
IBM—the recursive metonymy is therefore a composition of a Producer-for-
Product and a Whole-for-Part metonymy (cf. Example (12) for an expla-
nation of the latter case and Example (13) for the former case). The correct path
found by the Path Finder (among other ones) is p = (CLOCK-FREQUENCY,
Clock-Frequency-of, CPU, Cpu-of, MOTHERBOARD, Motherboard-of, CENTRAL-
UNIT, Central-Unit-of, COMPUTER-SYSTEM, Produced-by, PRODUCER). The path
has to be divided into three subpaths: p1 = (Clock-Frequency-of ) ∈ LP , p2 =
(Cpu-of ,Motherboard-of ,Central-Unit-of ) R Part-of ∈ MR, mirroring the
Whole-for-Part metonymy, and p3 = (Produced-by) ∈ MR, mirroring the
Producer-for-Productmetonymy.
3.3.3. Summarizing our claims
We equate conceptual interpretations with the identification of conceptual paths between
two concepts. The Path Finder computes conceptual interpretations of syntactic
relations. It operates as a search algorithm taking as input two concepts and yielding as
output relation paths between them. These paths reflect series of relations in the knowledge
base and must obey some well-formedness criteria. In particular, the algorithm makes sure
that these interpretations are consistent with the knowledge about relations encoded in the
knowledge base, therefore fulfilling Principle 1.
The basic finder algorithm takes only local information into account (two lexical items
and their conceptual correlates). It is therefore compatible with incremental interpretation
and does not need complete information about all the concepts and semantic constraints
that are introduced in an utterance.
The computation of individual paths is independent of the computation of other
paths. Thus, the existence of a literal interpretation does not exclude the computation
of metonymic interpretations. So the algorithm is independent of SRVs (cf., e.g., the
interpretation of Example (13)—“The Quantum achieves . . .”). This is in conformance
with Principle 2.
The Path Classifier makes use of well-known schemata of metonymies (e.g.,
Whole-for-Part), which are specified as general as possible. The explicit encoding
of domain-specific metonymies (e.g., Computer-for-CPU) is therefore not necessary.
Special instances of schemata are derived on the fly by instantiating specific relations
linked in the relation hierarchy. The schemata can also easily be extended by including
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additional relations in MR, without changing the general definition of metonymic paths
in Definition 3.5.
The algorithm developed so far covers literal interpretations, including one aspect of
granularity concerning transitive relations in a knowledge base. It covers and distinguishes
schematized metonymies, including recursive metonymies. Non-schematized metonymies
are included as unclassified paths—these interpretations are computed although detailed
information about the underlying referent is not available and a distinction from granularity
phenomena, not yet included in the set of literal paths, is not possible. Details about
occurrences of schematized and non-schematized metonymies in our domain are given
in Section 5.1.4. The Path Finder and Path Classifier cover metonymies with
and without SRVs.
We cannot, however, handle metonymies that already violate syntactic constraints like
so-called logical metonymies, in which a noun stands for the activity denoted by an absent
verb [44,59].
(15) “He began the book.”
In Example (15), “the book” stands for the action “reading/writing the book”. If “begin”
is specified in the grammar to only take a gerund or a to-infinitive as object, this metonymy
leads to syntactic violations. Since the Path Finder is only triggered to compute
interpretations of admissible syntactic relations in our approach, we are not able to handle
these metonymies, since a syntactic linkage is precluded. Note that this deficiency is not
implied by the Path Finder specification, but by its triggering condition.
We currently do not take language-specific idiosyncracies into account when com-
puting an interpretation. Thus, the Path Finder will also compute interpretations of
metonymies which are exceptions to a schema in a given language. So, it would compute
the interpretation “I eat the meat of a pig” for the sentence “I eat pig”, although the sen-
tence is normally not licensed in English.
4. Discourse constraints in disambiguation
Up to now, we focused on the computation of literal and metonymic readings, applying
Principle 1 (world knowledge consistency) and Principle 2 (consistency with selectional
restrictions). Despite the constraints both these principles introduce into the computation
process the Path Finder usually identifies more than one possible interpretation. This
raises the problem of disambiguation among alternative readings. We here rely mainly on
discourse constraints, especially reference constraints. In Section 4.1 we illustrate various
interaction patterns of metonymies and anaphora in depth, thus elaborating on our remarks
in Section 2.2. In particular, we want to point out that, first of all, not all metonymies lead
to a reference change (cf. the notion of predicative metonymies introduced by Stallard [53]
and Nunberg [42]) and, secondly, referential cohesion is not limited to coreference as is
evident from bridging phenomena [10]. In Section 4.2 we will provide a formal framework
which captures these interactions. Section 4.3 leads us to a ranking for alternative readings
based on the Principle of Referential Success and the Principle of the Direct Trigger. In
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Section 4.4 we will extend the non-incremental algorithm for metonymy resolution from
Section 4.3 to the incremental case.
4.1. Interaction patterns between metonymies and anaphora
We restrict the notion of (nominal) anaphora to definite noun phrases which are
coreferent with their antecedent, a noun phrase (including pronouns) in a previous
utterance. Apart from morphological and binding criteria, which are not an issue here [55],
a conceptual generalization relation must hold between the conceptual correlates of the
anaphor and its antecedent in the literal usage case.
Furthermore, we restrict the notion of bridging phenomena to textual ellipsis [27].
A textual ellipsis is a definite noun phrase whose reference is completely determined by
its conceptual relation to an antecedent noun phrase in a previous utterance. In contrast to
nominal anaphora, however, the textual ellipsis and its antecedent are not coreferent, but
are connected by a conceptual relation (excluding generalization relations), which is not
mentioned explicitly in the text, but has to be inferred from the background knowledge.
The following examples will clarify the interactions between anaphors, textual ellipses
and metonymies. They are extracted from our IT corpus but their syntactic structure has
been extremely simplified to make them more easily accessible and modified to reveal
more clearly the various interaction patterns.
Given a definite noun phrase w, we may distinguish between the following usage
patterns: 15
I. w is anaphoric
For all three subcases let w˜ be the antecedent of w. For reasons of simplicity we will
assume the antecedent w˜ to be literal. 16
1. w is literal.
This is the standard case of a nominal anaphor:
(16) “10 minutes before the notebook switches off, it starts beeping. 5 min-
utes later the display of the computer starts flashing as well.”
The literal denotation of w = “computer” allows for anaphora resolution to
w˜ = “notebook” as the conceptual correlates, COMPUTER-SYSTEM and NOTE-
BOOK, respectively, stand in a conceptual generalization relation, i.e., the concep-
tual correlate of the antecedent is a subconcept of the conceptual correlate of the
anaphoric expression. For Example (16), (w˜.con =) NOTEBOOK F COMPUTER-
SYSTEM (= w.con) holds. As w is literal, it fulfills the required selectional restric-
tions (we abstract from possible granularity phenomena).
15 When we sloppily refer to w as a ‘definite noun phrase’ in the following discussion, we actually mean the
lexical head noun of that phrase in the metonymic case.
16 If w˜ is used metonymically, then its conceptual correlate w˜.con has to be replaced by the conceptual class of
its underlying referent in the following discussion.
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2. w corresponds to a predicative metonymy: 17
(17) “10 minutes before the notebook switches off, it starts beeping.
The clock frequency of the computer is reduced to 8 MHz.”
The literal denotation of “computer” does not fulfill all selectional restrictions, as
“clock frequency” is a property attributed to a processor, not to a computer as such.
Thus, “computer” must be recognized as a metonymy for its CPU (cf. Example (12)).
However, the literal denotation is available for anaphora resolution—“computer”
(= w) resolves to “notebook” (= w˜). So w˜.con F w.con holds as for case 1
above. Predicative metonymies do not cause a reference change so that no significant
interaction between anaphora and metonymy resolution need take place.
3. w corresponds to a referential metonymy:
(18) “We also tested the printer Epson EPL-5600. I liked the laser, as its
printouts were excellent.” 18
(19) “We also tested the printer Epson EPL-5600. I liked the laser.”
In both examples, anaphora resolution of “the laser” (= w) to “Epson EPL-5600”
(= w˜) is fully dependent on the resolution of the Part-for-Whole metonymy
“laser” for “laser printer”. The required conceptual generalization relation between
w˜.con (= EPSON-EPL-5600) and w.con (= LASER) does not hold, although
w and w˜ are coreferent. It does hold, however, between the antecedent and the
inferentially recoverable referent of the anaphoric metonymy. So, if w is metonymic
for an instance of the conceptual class B (e.g., w = “laser” being metonymic for
B = LASER-PRINTER), then w˜.con (= EPSON-EPL-5600) F B holds.
One may argue that in Example (18) metonymy resolution can be achieved without
information about the possible anaphoric antecedent of “the laser”, as the analysis
of the entire sentence reveals a semantic violation (the combination of “the laser”
with “its printouts” will fail). This is yet another case of what we call indirect
violations (cf. also Example (5)), the recognition of which requires the resolution of
the possessive pronoun “its”, as well as a full syntactic analysis to precede metonymy
resolution. Considering an incremental approach, anaphora resolution for “the laser”
would be triggered before the information about the violation was available so that
the problem is reduced, in effect, to cases like Example (19).
Example (19) illustrates the benefits metonymy resolution gets from possible
anaphoric antecedents. Firstly, this information may help with choosing amongst
several metonymic readings—excluded are those readings that do not allow for
anaphora resolution (e.g., the competing metonymic reading “laser” for “light”)
(see also Examples (8) and (9)). Secondly, only the information about possible
antecedents can help triggering a metonymy resolution at all, since no semantic
constraints are violated (cf. also our remarks about soft selectional restrictions in
Section 2.1 and Examples (3) and (4)).
17 Stallard [53] and Nunberg [42] discern cases of predicative and referential metonymy, depending on whether
the literal or the inferentially recoverable referent, respectively, is available for subsequent pronominal reference.
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II. w is not anaphoric
1. w is literal.
The literal denotation of w fulfills all intrasentential semantic restrictions. Although
w is not anaphoric, it is still possible to establish referential cohesion via the
resolution of a textual ellipsis:
(20) “We also tested the printer Epson EPL-5600. I did not like the
paper tray.”
In Example (20), a conceptual relation (Part-of) between the conceptual correlates
of “paper tray” and “Epson EPL-5600” can be inferred. The parallel structure of
Examples (19) and (20) indicates that this criterion can also be met by anaphoric
noun phrases w that are referential metonymies. Thus, we may determine either
truly ambiguous readings or, at least, readings which cannot be distinguished without
further lexical or pragmatic information. We incorporate aptness constraints in order
to make informed choices among the alternatives.
2. w is metonymic.
There can be a variety of idiosyncratic non-anaphoric definite metonymies, e.g.,
metonymic reference to an entity not mentioned in the text before (e.g., “The White
House” for the US-President). These phenomena are very uncommon in our corpus,
at least. A phenomenon which happens to come up more often in our texts, however,
are predicative metonymies that are textual ellipses such as the following example:
(21) “10 minutes before the notebook switches off, it starts beeping.
The processor is throttled to 8 MHz.”
As only the frequency of a processor can be throttled, not the processor itself,
“the processor” is metonymic for its frequency. However, the literal denotation of
“processor” is available for a textual ellipsis, linking the conceptual correlates of
“processor” and “notebook” via a Part-of relation. Here, metonymy resolution and
textual ellipsis resolution are not interdependent as the metonymy can be recognized
by an SRV and the literal denotation is available for textual ellipsis resolution (see
the related issue for predicative metonymy and anaphora in Example (17)).
4.2. Determining referential readings
In order to determine referential readings, we will formalize the observations from
Section 4.1 and incorporate them into our path finding paradigm. For this purpose, we
now abstract from processing considerations (for the incremental extension of the basic
metonymy resolution algorithm, cf. Section 4.4).
Up to now, we have only considered whether one particular path between two concepts
(corresponding to one possible conceptual interpretation) can be classified as literal or
metonymic. We now introduce a two-way extension. First, we will be considering sets of
paths which have been computed by the Path Finder between the conceptual correlates
of two lexical items. Since we are not subscribing to the view that literal readings are
always preferred, we cannot exclude nonliteral paths from this path set a priori. Second,
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Table 4
Conditions for literal readings
w can be interpreted as literal ⇔
∀w′ ∈ Ui(w) (∃p ∈ P (w.con,w′.con) : literalp(w))
Table 5
Conditions for metonymic readings
w can be interpreted as a metonymy for (an instance of the concept class) B ⇔
∃w′ ∈ Ui(w) ((∃p ∈ P (w.con,w′.con) : metonymicp(w,B))
∧ (∀wˆ ∈Ui(w), wˆ =w′, (∃pˆ ∈ P (w.con, wˆ.con) : (metonymicpˆ(w,B)∨ literalpˆ(w)))))
we will consider cases where one lexical item can be syntactically related to several other
lexical items. As a consequence, we then have to account for sets of sets of paths when
resolving metonymies.
Let w be a definite noun phrase in the utterance Ui . We will call the set of all w′ ∈ Ui
that are syntactically related to w as Ui(w)—the construction of this set in a lexicalized
dependency grammar is described in detail in Romacker et al. [50]. All words that impose
selectional constraints on w are elements of Ui(w).
If w is literal, it must either fulfill all selectional restrictions or SRVs can be explained by
granularity considerations. 19 In our path finding paradigm, this means that any syntactic
relation between w and another word w′ ∈ Ui can be interpreted by a path p, which yields
a literal reading of w, i.e., a literal path p between w′.CON and w.CON, or a metonymic
path p which yields a metonymic interpretation of w′ and a literal one of w (see also
Definition 3.5). When a path p yields a literal interpretation ofw, we will write literalp(w).
The criteria under which w can receive a literal interpretation are summarized in Table 4.
If w is metonymic for an instance of the concept B, then there is at least one w′ ∈Ui(w),
so that a metonymic path p between w′.CON and w.CON exists with metonymicp(w,B).
As w cannot be metonymic for two different concepts all other paths from w.CON to any
wˆ.con, wˆ ∈Ui(w), must allow for the same metonymic interpretation or for a literal one. 20
The criteria for w under a metonymic interpretation are summarized in Table 5.
We may now accomodate these definitions to incorporate anaphora as well. Since the
identity of the antecedent is not known in advance, we have to consider a list of all possible
antecedents of w. Based on a functional centering framework [56], each utterance Ui−1
is assigned a partially ordered set of forward-looking centers Cf (Ui−1) containing the
possible antecedents for an anaphor in Ui . In our framework, this centering list consists of
19 We do not consider cases where selectional restrictions are violated due to metaphoric readings of the verb.
20 The co-occurrence of literal and metonymic interpretations of a word w regarding different words w′ in Ui
is possible. In the phrase “The clock-frequency of the new computer”, e.g., “computer” stands metonymically for
its processor with regard to the constraint imposed by “clock-frequency”, but in a literal relationship to “new”.
Alternatively, we may also argue that “new computer” stands metonymically for a processor of the new computer.
For a deeper treatment of such compositionality issues, cf. Stallard [53] and Nunberg [42].
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Table 6
Literal and predicative metonymic anaphora
w can be interpreted as a literal anaphor ⇔
w can be interpreted as literal ∧ ∃ c ∈ Cf (Ui−1) : class(c) F w.CON
w can be interpreted as a predicative metonymy for B and as anaphoric ⇔
w can be interpreted as a metonymy for B
∧ ∃ c ∈ Cf (Ui−1) : class(c) F w.CON
Table 7
Referential metonymic anaphora
w can be interpreted as a referential metonymy for B and as an anaphor ⇔
w can be interpreted as a metonymy for B ∧ ∃ c ∈ Cf (Ui−1) : class(c) F B
Table 8
Conditions for textual ellipsis
w can be interpreted as a literal textual ellipsis ⇔
w can be interpreted as literal ∧ ∃ c ∈ Cf (Ui−1) : P (class(c),w.con) = ∅
instances in the knowledge base, corresponding to the referents of words or phrases in the
text.
If w is a literal or a predicative metonymic anaphor, then w.CON allows for anaphora
resolution. Hence, the centering list contains an element whose class is a subconcept of
w.CON. These conventions are summarized in Table 6.
If w is a referential metonymy for an instance of B and an anaphor, too, then B (instead
of w.CON) allows for anaphora resolution (cf. Table 7).
If w is a literal textual ellipsis, then w.CON can be linked via a non-generalization
conceptual relation (i.e., a well-formed conceptual path) to its antecedent (cf. Table 8). 21
As the following discussion will show, these predicates are not mutually exclusive and
lead to ambiguous readings.
Example (16). With w = “computer”, U2(w) = (“display”) and Cf (U1) = (Note-
book-2, Minute-1) hold. The (only) well-formed path between DISPLAY und COM-
PUTER-SYSTEM found by the Path Finder is the literal path (DISPLAY, Visual-
Device-Of, NOTEBOOK). Therefore only a literal interpretation of “computer” is allowed
(cf. Table 4). Since class(Notebook-2) = NOTEBOOK F COMPUTER-SYSTEM (=
w.CON) holds, an interpretation of w as a literal anaphor to “notebook” is determined (cf.
Table 6).
21 This predicate can be generalised to textual ellipsis that are predicative metonymies (see Example (21)).
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Example (17). With w = “computer”, U2(w) = (“clock-frequency”) and Cf (U1) =
(Notebook-2, Minute-1) hold. The Path Finder finds only metonymic paths
between CLOCK-FREQUENCY and COMPUTER-SYSTEM, expressing that “computer” is
metonymic for an instance of the concept class CPU (= B) (see also Example (12)).
Therefore only a metonymic reading is possible (cf. Table 5). According to Table 6 an
interpretation as a predicative metonymy allows for anaphora resolution. An interpretation
as a referential one does not allow for anaphora resolution (cf. Table 7).
Examples (18) and (19). Cf (U1) = (Test-Team, Epson-EPL-5600-2) holds in
both cases, 22 as well as w = “laser” and U2(w) = (“liked”). The Path Finder finds
the following paths between LASER and LIKE.
1. (LIKE, Like-Patient, OBJECT) is a literal path expressing that “laser” is meant
literally. An anaphoric literal interpretation is not possible, as EPSON-EPL-5600
F LASER does not hold (cf. Table 6). An interpretation as a literal textual ellipsis is
possible with p = (EPSON-EPL-5600, Has-Laser, LASER) as the proper conceptual
relation (cf. Table 8). This reading means that we really talk about an instance of the
class LASER, which is Part-of the LASER-PRINTER mentioned before.
2. (LIKE, Like-Patient, OBJECT, F , EPSON-EPL-5600, Has-Laser, LASER) is a
metonymic path expressing a Part-for-Whole metonymy where “laser” stands
for an instance of the class EPSON-EPL-5600 =: B (cf. Table 5 and Definition 3.5).
Regarding anaphora resolution, the following two hypotheses are valid.
(a) “Laser” is a predicative metonymy. Then anaphora resolution is precluded (cf.
Table 6).
(b) “Laser” is a referential metonymy. Then anaphora resolution to “Epson-EPL-
5600” is possible (cf. Table 7).
Example (20). Similar results as for Examples (18) and (19) hold for Example (20). The
Path Finder finds the two paths (Like-Patient) und (Like-Patient, Has-Paper-Tray),
which allow for the same kinds of readings as Example (19). The ambiguity between a
literal textual ellipsis reading and a referential metonymic anaphoric reading is especially
frequent.
Example (5). At this point it is worthwhile to revisit Example (5), which we have
already analyzed from the Path Finder perspective. Here, w = “Quantum”, U2(w)=
(“achieves”) and Cf (U1)= (LPS105-2, Performance-1) hold. Therefore, a literal
reading of “Quantum” does not allow for anaphora resolution as neither PERFORMANCE
F QUANTUM nor LPS-105 F QUANTUM holds. However, if we interpret “Quantum”
metonymically for an instance of the concept HARD-DISK-DRIVE, then anaphora
resolution to “LPS 105” is possible, assuming the path p := (ACHIEVE, Achieve-Agent,
F , HARD-DISK-DRIVE, Produced-by, PRODUCER) can be determined.
22 Given the discourse context of a typical IT test report, and technical writers acting simultaneously as test
personnel, “We” has TEST-TEAM as a conceptual correlate. This item is, nevertheless, ruled out as a potential
antecedent for “the laser” due to number disagreement.
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Table 9
Principle of Referential Success for literal and
metonymic readings
literal anaphor >ref other literal readings
metonymic anaphor >ref other metonymic readings
Table 10
Principle of the Direct Trigger for anaphoric readings
(literal anaphor ∨ predicative metonymic anaphor) >ref
referential metonymic anaphor
literal anaphor >ref textual ellipsis
4.3. Ranking alternative readings
A crucial problem arising from the non-determinacy of the criteria proposed so
far is their potential for creating alternative interpretations. In this section we will
introduce two general disambiguation heuristics and integrate them into the metonymy
resolution procedure. The first of these is inspired by Crain and Steedman [14], who
propose a Principle of Referential Success for syntactic ambiguity resolution. Applied to
metonymy resolution (cf. also Principle 3 in Section 2.3), it implements the preference for
readings that establish referential cohesion over ones that do not (always assuming that
both readings are compatible with intrasentential and knowledge-based constraints). Its
formulation in Table 9 combines the preference assumptions (indicated by “>”) for literal
and metonymic readings.
Nunberg [41] claimed that anaphoric readings which are directly triggered (i.e., by
equality or by a generalization relation between anaphor and antecedent, like literal
anaphora) should be preferred over other anaphoric constructions (e.g., textual ellipsis or
referential metonymic anaphora). This is reflected in the Principle of the Direct Trigger
(Table 10).
These two basic heuristics can be combined in different ways. One choice is to assume
a strict preference of literal over figurative readings—such a Literal-Meaning-First (LMF)
approach (cf. Table 11) has been adopted by the majority of researchers in the field of
metonymy processing.
Here, the Principle of Referential Success is used only within literal or metonymic
readings. When a metonymy does not violate intrasentential constraints, a competing
literal reading always exists, which according to Table 11 will then always be preferred
over the metonymic one. This disregards the possibility that discourse constraints might
nevertheless favor the metonymic reading. We therefore subscribe to the disambiguation
heuristics expressed in Table 12. This ranking incorporates the Principle of Referential
Success (cf. Table 9) and the Principle of the Direct Trigger (cf. Table 10), but avoids
preferring literal readings over metonymic ones in all circumstances. In addition, it
incorporates a preference for conventional readings (literal or schematized metonymic
ones) over unconventional ones (unclassified readings) (cf. Principle 4 in Section 2.3).
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Table 11
Literal-Meaning-First approach
literal anaphor >ref -LMF
(literal) textual ellipsis >ref -LMF
other literal readings >ref -LMF
predicative metonymic anaphor >ref -LMF
referential metonymic anaphor >ref -LMF
other metonymic readings
Table 12
Disambiguation scheme for literal and metonymic readings
literal anaphor >ref
predicative metonymic anaphor >ref
(referential metonymic anaphor ∨ literal non-anaphoric readings,
including textual ellipsis) >ref
non-anaphoric metonymic readings >ref
unclassified readings
Our disambiguation heuristics have also been evaluated against the heuristics in Table 11.
They led to an increase in metonymy resolution from 69% of all anaphoric metonymies to
84.5%. The data are illustrated in detail in Section 5.2.3.
We may now formulate a (non-incremental) algorithm for the interpretation of a definite
noun phrase w in Ui :
1. Determine all possible literal and metonymic readings of w that are compatible
with the intrasentential selectional restrictions. In our framework this can be done
as follows:
(a) Determine Ui(w).
(b) Determine all well-formed conceptual paths between w′.CON and w.CON for all
w′ ∈ Ui(w) using the Path Finder.
(c) Derive all literal and metonymic readings from these paths, using the Path
Classifier and the predicates in Tables 4 and 5.
2. Determine the possible anaphoric readings for the ensuing literal and metonymic
readings with the predicates in Tables 6, 7 and 8, using Cf (Ui−1), the list of forward
looking centers of Ui−1.
3. Disambiguate between the ensuing readings using the preference ranking in Table 12.
Our algorithm does not affect the resolution of literal anaphora. For Example (16) only a
literal reading of “computer” is possible. We prefer to interpret this reading as an anaphor
to “notebook” (instead of assuming that a new computer is introduced) (see line 1 in
Table 12). Example (17) shows that metonymies with SRVs are handled as in all other
approaches, since no competing literal interpretation exists. Thus, “computer” in Example
(17) is treated as a Whole-for-Part metonymy. As the literal meaning of “computer”
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allows for anaphora resolution we treat the metonymy as a predicative one (line 2 of Table
12).
Our algorithm allows for the resolution of anaphoric metonymies that are not marked
by an SRV. So, in Example (19), “the laser” can be resolved to “Epson EPL-5600” in at
least one reading (line 3 of Table 12). The previous discourse also rejects unplausible
metonymic readings that might have been licensed from an intrasentential perspective
only, but become void in the discourse context as, e.g., a “laser” for “light” reading (see
also Examples (8) and (9)). The computation of such readings is usually blocked by our
notion of extended connectivity (cf. Definition 3.4), which takes the discourse context into
account. In addition, any such reading is ranked low in Table 12 (line 4). We also do
not depend on information about indirect semantic constraints that may not be available
when metonymy or anaphora resolution is called for and which are hard to recognize (see
Examples (18) and (5), which are handled in the same way as Example (19)). Our approach
therefore clearly extends both metonymy and anaphora resolution.
A crucial problem of our approach lies in the disjunction in line 3 of Table 12, which is
a continuous source of ambiguity. Whereas it leads correctly to an ambiguity in Example
(19), it also leads to the same kind of ambiguity in Example (20) where this is clearly not
wished for. In the latter example, “paper tray” should only be interpreted literally as the
paper tray of the laser printer, i.e., as a case of textual ellipsis, and not have an additional
reading as an anaphoric reference for “the printer Epson EPL-5600” via a Part-for-
Whole metonymy. The algorithm as proposed so far does not yield any criteria to prevent
this kind of overgeneration.
This is by no means an artificial problem created by our algorithm . Rather, it mirrors
the fact that the resolution of metonymies is not fully constrained by metonymic patterns
like Part-for-Whole or Producer-for-Product. One may ask why “laser” can
easily stand for a laser printer, whereas “paper tray” cannot? This question is more or
less independent of applying an SRV-based approach or not. Although in this particular
example the lexematic similarity between the words laser and laser printer might play
a role, other examples show that conceptual reasons play a bigger role. Why is it that
“screen” can easily be used metonymically for a TV, whereas “transistor” is much harder?
Or that “head” is often used metonymically for a person, whereas “kidneys” are not? We
hypothesize that the typicality and visibility of parts play a crucial role for this metonymic
usage (so, e.g., a laser is a more typical part for a laser printer than the paper tray, as it
distinguishes a laser printer from other kinds of printers; the head is more visible than
the kidneys, etc.). Hahn and Markert [25] formalise three aptness heuristics that capture
these intuitions and further constrain coercion, so that the ambiguity in line 3 of Table 12
does only arise for apt metonymies (see also Principle 5). Another reason might be related
to the functionality of components: a laser carries the main part of the functionality of a
laser printer whereas a paper tray does not. This latter point was raised by one anonymous
reviewer.
Still a hard case to deal with are non-definite metonymic noun phrases, which we
can only handle when they violate selectional restrictions. In general, the ‘Principle of
Referential Success’ is not applicable to them. So we fall back on preferring literal over
metonymic readings if two or more readings fulfill intrasentential selectional restrictions,
although we will show in Section 5.1 that this is not satisfactory (see also Example (3)).
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Table 13
Local conditions for literal readings
w can locally be interpreted as literal ⇔
∃p ∈ P (w.con,w′.con) : literalp(w)
Table 14
Local conditions for metonymic readings
w can locally be interpreted as a metonymy
for (an instance of the concept class) B ⇔
∃p ∈ P (w.con,w′.con) :metonymicp(w,B)
4.4. Incremental metonymy resolution
The algorithm described above and the predicates in the Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 are non-
incremental as they depend on using all w′ in Ui(w). In an incremental algorithm not
all such w′ are known when metonymy resolution or anaphora resolution actually takes
place. We can adapt the original algorithm to an incremental processing mode under
the assumption that metonymy resolution and anaphora resolution are triggered when a
particular conceptual relationship betweenw.CON and anotherw′.CON is being determined
(as an interpretation of a syntactic relation). 23
1. Determine all possible literal and metonymic readings of w that are compatible with
the selectional restriction mediated by w′. In our framework this can be done as
follows:
(a) Determine all well-formed conceptual paths between w′.CON and w.CON using
the Path Finder.
(b) Derive all literal and metonymic readings from these paths, using the Path
Classifier and local equivalents of the predicates in Tables 4 and 5 as given
in Tables 13 and 14, respectively.
2. Determine the possible anaphoric readings for the ensuing literal and metonymic
readings with local equivalents of the predicates in Tables 6, 7 and 8, usingCf (Ui−1),
the list of forward looking centers of Ui−1.
3. Disambiguate between the ensuing readings using the preference ranking from
Table 12.
The incremental version of the algorithm needs only little specification changes
compared with its non-incremental version. For determining literal and metonymic
readings we use only one w′ ∈ Ui(w) and the Path Finder, which operates locally on
two concepts. The ensuing paths will be classified as usual, since the Path Classifier
operates on single paths anyway. The two predicates for literal and metonymic readings in
their ‘local’ version are defined in Tables 13 and 14, assuming w′ as an arbitrary constant.
Anaphoric interpretation is not affected at all by incrementality, since the centering list is
given at the end of the previous sentence already, and is therefore available for determining
anaphoric readings no matter when anaphora resolution is carried out. One example would
be the local interpretation of Table 6 in Table 15. Also, the disambiguation scheme
(Table 12) remains stable for different processing strategies.
23 One possibility is to proceed from left to right and use the relationship to the left-most w′ to be established.
Another possibility, which we will evaluate in Section 5, is to base disambiguation on a particular prominent type
of dependency relation, e.g., between w and its head. This relationship is especially important as every word has
exactly one head in a dependency grammar, whereas it can have several modifiers.
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Table 15
Literalness and predicative metonymies as anaphors—the incremental inter-
pretation
w can locally be interpreted as literal and as anaphoric ⇔
w can be locally interpreted as literal
∧ ∃ c ∈ Cf (Ui−1) : class(c) F w.CON
w can be locally interpreted as pred. metonymy for B and as anaphor ⇔
w can be locally interpreted as metonymy for B
∧ ∃ c ∈ Cf (Ui−1) : class(c)F w.CON
As the decision on metonymic or literal readings and the disambiguation predicate have
only a local basis, one might expect that they are more prone to errors. Assume a locally
chosen reading that turns out not to be compatible with the selectional restrictions which
surface during the processing of the rest of the sentence. Then backtracking is needed,
which we have not incorporated yet. In our experiments it turned out, however, that local
disambiguation is surprisingly accurate for our texts (at least, if one chooses w’s head as
w′)—the reason being that one of the main influences on disambiguation is the previous
discourse, which does not change as more selectional restrictions are incorporated. Coming
back, e.g., to Example (5)—if anaphora and metonymy resolution are triggered when
establishing the relation between “Quantum” and “achieves”, we already establish the
literal and the metonymic reading due to the discourse context (line 3 in Table 12). Later
inconsistencies for the literal reading signalled by an indirect semantic constraint violation
might lead to discarding it, but the correct metonymic interpretation remains. (Note that in
the examples discussed so farUi(w) contains only one element, so that the non-incremental
and incremental algorithm make no difference to the final readings.)
5. Evaluation
We will now give an evaluation of both our theoretical claims, regarding the interactions
of metonymies with selectional restrictions and with nominal anaphora (Section 5.1), and
of the incremental metonymy resolution algorithm described in Section 4.4 (Section 5.2).
We analyzed a sample of 16 German-language product reviews from information
technology magazines. The texts contained a total of 622 sentences. 24 The gold standard
for comparison was determined manually by considering all nouns (including proper
names) in the sample. Other phenomena (e.g., pronouns or verbs) were discarded from
analysis because they are rarely metonymic. The test set contained 2719 nouns.
24 This evaluation is an extension of the one presented in Markert and Hahn [38]. In the latter paper we refer
to 26 texts, with one text being a compilation of 12 printer reviews. We here count this compilation as only one
single text for reasons of comparison with other evaluation data. We enhance our previous evaluation by including
farther developed annotation principles for metonymies, as well as a more fine-grained distinction of semantic
violations.
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5.1. Occurrence rates
5.1.1. Metonymies
For every noun we decided whether it was metonymic and, if so, resolved the metonymy.
This way, we manually annotated the texts with pairs of the form (metonymic expression—
resolved metonymy). The annotation built on a stringent theoretical distinction between
literal and figurative language [26], which forms the basis for simple replacement tests
for deciding on metonymy. These tests are primarily based on metonymic schemata—
for the Producer-for-Product schema, e.g., the following rule was used, which is
applicable to all words w in the lexicon mapped to a concept in the knowledge base that
is a subconcept of PRODUCER (e.g., all producer names such as “Quantum”, the noun
“company”, etc.): If w occurs in an utterance U , then replace w, on the one hand, by
the expression “producer w” (literal reading) and, on the other hand, by the expression
“product by w” (metonymic reading). Choose the replacement which captures the sense of
the utterance most adequately in the given discourse context. Similar rules were developed
for the other schemata we employ.
Our test set also contained non-schematic metonymies. If neither the literal reading
nor the schematic metonymic readings fulfilled the replacement test, we looked for other
metonymic readings. In this case, we relied mainly on our intuition. If we determined w
to be metonymic for an instance of the concept B , the replacement test with B was carried
out to check that intuition.
If both a literal and a metonymic reading (or neither) fulfilled the replacement test, the
example was seen as literal to avoid including metonymies into our test set where the
decision was not clear cut.
Given these conventions, we identified 106 metonymies in the 622 sentences. This means
that 17% of all sentences contained a metonymy and that semantic analysis would fail for
a wide range of sentences without metonymy resolution.
5.1.2. Interaction of anaphors and metonymies
We also annotated nominal anaphors (anaphoric expression—antecedent) and textual
ellipses (elliptic expression—antecedent) in the sample. For most of the 16 texts (451 from
622 sentences) this annotation was carried out independently of the authors by one of our
colleagues who used the same corpus as evaluation data for a centering algorithm [56].
The remainder was annotated by the authors themselves, using the same method. This
independent annotation of metonymies and anaphora is crucial for the exclusion of biases
in metonymy annotation, e.g., to avoid concentrating on anaphoric metonymies only. We
found 303 nominal anaphors and 355 textual ellipses in the sample.
When comparing the two annotations, we found the following interactions. From the
perspective of metonymies, 78 (73.6%) of them were (heads of) definite noun phrases 25
and 58 (54.7% of all metonymies; 74.4% of all definite metonymies) were nominal
anaphors. This high co-occurrence rate can be compared with the general occurrence rate
25 Definite noun phrases in German are ones which contain a definite article, either “der”, “die”, “das”, or one of
their inflectional variants, contractions of prepositions with these definite articles (e.g., “zur”, “zum”) and deictic
expressions incorporating the basic form “dies”. All the other remaining noun phrases are here called non-definite.
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of anaphora. Of all 2719 noun phrases in all the texts 1287 (47.33%) were definite noun
phrases and only 303 (11.14% of all noun phrases; 23.54% of all definite noun phrases)
were nominal anaphors. 26 Therefore, we conclude that metonymies have a tendency to be
anaphoric.
From the perspective of anaphora, the following picture emerges. 58 from 303 nominal
anaphora (19.1%) are metonymic. From these, 50 (16.5% of all nominal anaphora) are
referential metonymies. Note that these anaphora are not resolvable with the standard
semantic criteria, unless metonymy resolution is incorporated (cf. Section 4.1). This
number is rather high and might indicate some degree of genre specificity (e.g., in the
product reviews one encounters a lot of Producer-for-Productmetonymies, which
are always referential and mostly anaphoric). Interestingly enough, in a follow-up study
using our methodology, Harabagiu [29] was able to replicate this data for another text
genre and the English language as well. In particular, she points out that 16.3% of the
nominal anaphora that appeared in 20 texts from the New York Times can only be dealt
with by including a dedicated metonymy resolution mechanism.
This data supports our view that the interaction of metonymies and anphora is especially
frequent and its incorporation into a metonymy resolution algorithm will eventually result
in a significant performance improvement of both anaphora and metonymy resolution
algorithms.
5.1.3. Semantic violations
Up to now we have illustrated our claim why SRVs are inadequate as a triggering
condition for metonymy resolution with examples only. Since explicit data has been
lacking so far in the discussion of metonymy resolution algorithms, we will substantiate
our claims with quantitative data from our test set.
Identifying a direct SRV is a rather straightforward task. As noted in Section 3.1,
selectional restrictions are incorporated in range restrictions of concept roles in the
knowledge base (e.g., Agent and Patient restrictions for a verb). Whenever a syntactic
relation between a word w and some w′ ∈ Ui(w) is going to be established and its
conceptual correlate w.CON does not belong to the range of the corresponding conceptual
role of w′.CON, an SRV is encountered.
In our study of SRVs we have included the syntactic relations listed in Table 16. Verb
roles encompass direct and indirect objects as well as the subject. Logical metonymies
are included here as well. PP-attachment encompasses attachments to nouns, verbs and
adjectives. Approaches which handle such direct SRVs only (e.g., Fass [17] and Amghar
et al. [1]) are systematically limited to 49 (46.23%) of all metonymies.
Identifying an indirect semantic violation is much harder than a direct SRV. In many
cases there is no clear-cut dividing line between readings that cause semantic violations and
readings that are semantically well-formed, but rather odd due to default assumptions about
lexemes or the real world, or readings that cause conceptual or pragmatic violations. As a
first approximation, we identified metonymies with semantic violations as metonymies
26 Comparable occurrence rates are reported by Fraurud [20], who counts 36% of definite noun phrases to be
nominal anaphora in a Swedish corpus. The remaining difference may be due to different text genres or language-
specific properties of the texts.
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Table 16
Types and occurrence data of direct SRVs
Type of SRV Example Frequency
Verb roles “der Prozessor wird zurückgefahren” 31
(“the processor is throttled down”)
(Processor-for-Frequency)
Genitives “Der Kontrast des LCD” 10
(“The contrast of the LCD”) (LCD-for-Picture)
Adjective-Noun “das helle Display” 5
modifications (“the bright display”) (LCD-for-Picture)
PP-attachments “ist er mit 2 MByte bestückt” 3
(“it [the computer] is equipped with 2 MByte”) (MByte-for-
Storage)
∑
frequency 49
exhibiting purely sentence-internal violations that do not need additional conceptual
inference, default reasoning or discourse for recognition.
Four subtypes of indirect semantic violations appear in Table 17. Type I (Verb frame)
has already been mentioned by Fass [17] and Iverson and Helmreich [32] (cf. also
Example (5)). Two arguments fulfil the restrictions of a verb when considered in isolation,
but fail to do so when both restrictions are combined. This holds especially between the
subject and direct or indirect object of a verb.
Type II are restrictions brought about by relative clauses of the type “w that/who/which
performs an action” or “w that/who/which an action is performed on”. In such a
construction the literal reading of w violates an indirect semantic restriction if it violates
a (direct) SRV in the transformations “w performs an action” or “an action is performed
on w”. Thus, “the laser that prints” violates an indirect semantic restriction as “the laser
prints” violates a direct one.
Type III are semantic violations which result from resolving a comparative or a
comparison between two objects, where one is referred to metonymically, e.g., “The hard
disk is as good as/better than the Seagate”. Comparisons can be handled by determining
candidate correlates between which the comparison is carried out (here, e.g., between
“hard disk” and “Seagate”). Depending on the restrictions one puts on correlate types,
we can only determine the comparison if we interpret “Seagate” metonymically. Note that
this is the easiest case of the interaction between metonymies and comparatives (for a
more detailed study including discourse phenomena, cf. Staab and Hahn [52]). For reasons
of simplicity, we regard all comparatives where one of the correlates is metonymic as
instances of intrasentential violations.
Type IV are semantic violations that presume the resolution of anaphors that are not
identical to w. These anaphora resolutions do not interact with metonymy resolution,
but only help with discovering an intrasentential violation. Discourse constraints on the
metonymy itself are not seen as intrasentential semantic violations.
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Table 17
Types and occurrence data of indirect semantic violations
Type of violation Example Frequency
Verb frames “Grafik wie Fotos bringt der Laser.”
(“the laser yields graphics and photos”)
(Laser-for-Laser-Printer) 18
Relative clauses “Vieldrucker, die jeden Tag viele Seiten ausgeben” 3
(“people who print many pages every day”)
(User-for-Printer)
Comparatives or comparisons “ein Laufwerk, das genauso geringe Aussenmasse besitzt wie
die Maxtor”
(“a hard disk that is as small as the Maxtor”)
(Producer-for-Product) 7
Previous anaphors “sie [Quantum-Festplatte] lag in etwa gleichauf mit der
Seagate auf Platz 1”
2
(“it [the Quantum hard disk] is on level pegging with the
Seagate at rank 1”)
(Producer-for-Product)
∑
frequency 30
We also regard all combinations of these semantic violations as a semantic violation.
So, in the example “It is on level pegging with the Seagate”, the discovery of the violation
involves the resolution of a pronominal anaphor that does not interact with metonymy
resolution and the discovery of an indirect verb frame violation. In many of these examples
information about anaphoric readings of the metonymy can give clues to metonymic
readings before the violation is encountered. It is also often easier to identify and does not
need the interaction of several semantic processes. So, in the example described above,
“the Seagate” can be anaphorically resolved to “a hard disk produced by Seagate” in
the metonymic reading. This gives evidence for a metonymy following the ‘Principle
of Referential Success’ without heavy inferencing. As discovering indirect violations is
usually very hard, almost none of the previous approaches to metonymy resolution describe
what kinds of violations they cover (apart from direct SRVs).
Finally, we found 27 (25.47% of all metonymies) examples without any intrasentential
violations—a substantial number. Here we included metonymies that can only be
recognized by discourse constraints or conceptual inferences. Examples for the first type
have been given throughout the paper (see Section 4.1). They are especially common with
evaluative phrases (“The Quantum achieves good results”), but can also be present in
descriptions (“The laser is in the secretary’s office”). Dealing with the second type requires
a wide variety of inference types, which we do not provide as yet—temporal reasoning for
Example (3), reasoning about the likelihood of people being on shelves for Example (22)
(cf. Nunberg [42] for similar examples).
(22) “Pynchon is on the top shelf.”
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Table 18
Occurrence data for metonymies
Direct Ind. sem. No sem. Frequency of
SRV violation violation occurrence
Anaphora 18 (17.0%) 22 (20.8%) 18 (17.0%) 58 (54.7%)
Other definite NPs 10 (9.4%) 7 (6.6%) 3 (2.8%) 20 (18.9%)
Non-definite NPs 21 (19.8%) 1 (0.9%) 6 (5.7%) 28 (26.4%)
∑
49 (46.2%) 30 (28.3%) 27 (25.5%) 106 (100.0%)
The occurrence data for metonymies is summarized in Table 18 (percentages are
rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent). In the table “ind.” stands for “indirect” and
“sem.” for “semantic”.
5.1.4. Schematized versus non-schematized metonymies
Our texts contained mainly metonymies that belonged to one of the 5 schemata we
described in Section 3.3. Of the 106 metonymies we found, 92 (86.79%) belonged to one
of the given schemata, 6 were logical metonymies and only the remaining 8 were non-
schematized metonymies. Therefore our data on unconventional metonymies is scarce.
Even of these 8 non-schematized metonymies, some were not really unconventional
metonymies, but belonged to a schema that we have not included yet. So, in the example
“The processor is throttled down” we encounter a Processor-for-Frequency
metonymy, which is basically a Object-for-Attribute metonymy. This is not
covered by our schemata, but is not really unconventional either, being similar to Whole-
for-Part metonymies. Thus, truly innovative metonymies similar to Example (1) were
limited to one or two examples in our corpus. These were highly context-dependent
examples: so, e.g., a previously mentioned cursor was referred to anaphorically as “the
arrow” in one text.
5.2. Resolution rates
5.2.1. Method
From an architectural point of view, the metonymy resolution process interacts with
the parsing and anaphora resolution process. However, in order to avoid error chaining,
i.e., carrying over or interacting with the erroneous results from these co-processes, the
input from these components was simulated manually. In particular, the two concepts
with which the Path Finder and the Path Classifier are fed and, for definite
noun phrases, the list of possible anaphoric antecedents from the previous utterance
contained in the centering list were manually extracted from the texts. With this data
supplied, the metonymy resolution algorithm, composed of the Path Finder and Path
Classifier, as well as the disambiguation on the basis of metonymic schemata and
discourse information were carried out fully automatically.
Thus, for every metonymy w we extracted its syntactic head w′ and ran the Path
Finder and Path Classifier with w.CON and w′.CON, respectively. For definite
noun phrases, we also supplied the centering list of the previous utterance. For Example
182 K. Markert, U. Hahn / Artificial Intelligence 135 (2002) 145–198
(23), e.g., we supplied the Path Finder and Path Classifier with the concepts
TOSHIBA and COME-UP-WITH.
(23) “Toshiba hat sich mehr einfallen lassen.”
“Toshiba came up with more ideas.”
(Organisation-for-Membersmetonymy, a subtype of Whole-for-
Part metonymies; cf. Lakoff and Johnson [35])
For non-definite metonymies, an LMF disambiguation (preferring literal over metonymic
readings) was carried out. For definite metonymies we used the disambiguation scheme in
Table 12.
A schematic metonymy w for an instance of concept B (as determined in the annotation
phase) is correctly resolved if one of the computed paths p incorporates the correct
metonymic reading metonymicp(w,B) (see Definition 3.5) and is ranked first by the
disambiguation criteria (other readings might be ranked equally high as well). For
metonymies that are not schematic, w is considered as correctly resolved, if an unclassified
path passing B was ranked first. In cases of an anaphoric metonymy we also required the
correct antecedent to be found.
5.2.2. Non-definite metonymies
From a total of 106 metonymies, we encountered 28 non-definite metonymies of which
six occurred without semantic violations (cf. Table 18). For these six, the literal reading
is incorrectly ranked highest by our disambiguation predicate, since for non-definite NPs
we follow a strict LMF policy. One single metonymy appeared with an indirect semantic
violation. As it occurred within a comparative it could be recognized and interpreted
correctly due to the interaction between comparatives and metonymies [52].
21 non-definite metonymies violated SRVs. 4 of them were logical metonymies, which
we cannot resolve due to the failure of establishing a syntactic link, which we require
to hold before metonymy resolution is started at all. From the remaining 17 non-definite
metonymies with SRVs, 12 could be correctly resolved, i.e., the Path Finder found
the correct path and it was ranked highest. In these cases the result was also unambiguous.
So, Example (23) was correctly interpreted as a Whole-for-Part metonymy (for the
employees of Toshiba). In the other five cases, two metonymies could not be resolved as
the corresponding concepts were not specified in the knowledge base. Three other ones
remained unresolved because the Path Finder was unable to find the correct paths.
Therefore 13 (46.4%) from 28 non-definite metonymies could be correctly resolved. The
main reasons for this low rate are the choice of the LMF approach for disambiguation and
the inability to deal with logical metonymies.
5.2.3. Definite metonymies
From the 20 non-anaphoric definite metonymies, the three without semantic violations
could not be resolved due to lacking specifications of the head w′ in the knowledge base.
Regarding the seven with indirect semantic violations, five could be resolved because of the
interaction with comparatives. The other two could not be resolved—the Path Finder
did not find any path between w.CON and w′.CON as we excluded global specialization
during the search process (cf. Definition 3.4). From the ten metonymies with direct
violations, six were resolved correctly and unambiguously; one was a logical metonymy
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which we cannot account for; in three cases the Path Finder did not find the valid
paths, again, due to excluding a global specialization in the search process. Thus, only 11
(55.0%) of the definite non-anaphoric metonymies could be resolved.
Our discourse predicates directly refer to anaphoric metonymies and, therefore, could
not be used for non-definite metonymies and the analysis of non-anaphoric definite
metonymies. When discourse knowledge is made accessible a direct positive effect on
the resolution quality can be expected. Indeed, from 58 anaphoric metonymies only three
were not resolved because of lacking knowledge specifications. In four cases the Path
Finder found only paths which did not express the correct metonymic schema. In all
other 51 cases the Path Finder identified the correct path (among others).
Our disambiguation schema in Table 12 ranked the metonymic reading correctly on first
place in 49 of the 51 cases, although in 34 cases literal readings were found as well and
ranked equally high (line 3 of Table 12). This was only the case when no SRV at the headw′
was encountered. In cases without any semantic violations it is correct that the ambiguity
between literal and metonymic readings remains (cf. Example (19)). In cases with an indi-
rect semantic violation, our evaluation method leads to an ambiguity in many cases as we
used only local constraints for w′—in an actual parsing setting it is more likely that the lit-
eral reading is subsequently discarded when the indirect semantic violation is encountered,
thus increasing the precision of the procedure. We currently have no data on this issue.
On the whole 49 (84.5%) of the 58 anaphoric metonymies could be resolved. This high
rate lends some credit to our disambiguation ranking. Especially important is the fact that
86.4% of all anaphoric metonymies marked by an indirect semantic violation and 88.9%
without a violation can be resolved—with local information only. Approaches relying on
semantic violations only are systematically restricted to 40 (69.0%) from all 58 anaphoric
metonymies (18 direct SRV and 22 indirect violations; see Table 18). We conclude by
summarizing all resolution rates for metonymies in Table 19. In the Table “ind.” stands for
“indirect”.
5.3. Discussion
Our data indicates that metonymies and anaphora interact heavily and that any approach
accounting for these interactions will be beneficial to the resolution rate for both anaphors
and metonymies. In addition, it seems that SRVs are not as frequent with metonymies
as commonly believed—even metonymies without any semantic violation occur quite
frequently.
Table 19
Resolution data for metonymies
Direct SRV Ind. violation No violation Overall
Anaphora (14/18) 77.8% (19/22) 86.4% (16/18) 88.9% 84.5%
Other definite NPs (6/10) 60.0% (5/7) 71.4% (0/3) 0.0% 55.0%
Non-definites (12/21) 57.1% (1/1) 100.0% (0/6) 0.0% 46.4%
Overall (32/49) 65.3% (25/30) 83.3% (16/27) 59.3% 68.9%
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Our approach copes successfully with anaphoric metonymies because it takes into
account the explicit interaction of metonymy and anaphora resolution, which leads to
a greater independence from SRVs. This holds even for an incremental approach. Our
resolution rates for non-anaphoric metonymies are certainly not satisfactory—the main
reason being that we are then fully dependent on SRVs and that the Path Finder has
no access to discourse information.
We frankly admit that this evaluation is but one step towards more sophisticated experi-
ments (both in method and scope). Nevertheless, it is one of the first evaluations at all that
deal with metonymy resolution for real-world texts. Although Stallard [53] and Harabagiu
[29] evaluate their approaches, too, they do not handle the issue of occurrences of semantic
violations. In addition, they do not give general data on how many metonymies are resolved
correctly by their approach (Harabagiu only gives these data for anaphoric metonymies;
Stallard only mentions that semantic analysis is hugely improved by metonymy resolution,
but does not give explicit numbers on how many metonymies are resolved correctly). Our
evaluation, however, shares the following drawbacks with the other evaluations:
• All evaluations are highly domain- and/or genre-dependent as well as small in scope.
Investigations across corpora are still missing, too.
• The methodology of determining metonymies and their correct readings is dependent
on the intuitions of the researchers. No generally accepted annotation scheme exists
as yet. This issue is normally not even discussed nor are any tests for detecting
metonymies offered apart from detecting SRVs (which only cover less than half of
all metonymies). In this respect, we have offered a way forward via replacement tests
starting from accepted schemata.
• The issue of false positives is normally not touched upon at all. We have given a small
evaluation of false positives in Hahn and Markert [25].
6. Related work
Research on metonymy resolution has mainly been pursued in two communities. One
group of researchers rely on ‘deep’ conceptual, language-independent knowledge reposito-
ries, typically a sophisticated knowledge base with powerful inferencing capabilities—we
refer to this work as knowledge-based paradigm (cf. Section 6.1). Another major stream of
work has its roots in linguistics. Many of the foundational descriptive insights into the na-
ture of figurative language, e.g., by Stern [54], Apresjan [2], Lakoff and Johnson [35], Bon-
homme [3], lack computational orientation, however. Those with a more technical back-
ground assume that the knowledge required for metonymy interpretation is best captured
in the lexicon as metonymies also have many language-dependent properties—we refer to
this approach as the lexicon-based paradigm (cf. Section 6.2).
6.1. Knowledge-based approaches to metonymy interpretation
Knowledge-based approaches to metonymy interpretation assume that, given some sort
of knowledge representation format (e.g., predicate calculus formulae, semantic networks,
frames), a conceptual relation can be established between the metonymic expression and
its underlying referent as part of the process of semantic or conceptual interpretation. Such
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a relation is usually identified by some mechanism searching the underlying knowledge
base. Aside from these general commonalities relating to Principle 1, our approach can be
contrasted with earlier work in the knowledge-based paradigm in the following way:
• All other knowledge-based approaches treat only metonymies that violate sentence-
internal syntactic or semantic well-formedness constraints. Problems emerging from
such an approach have been detailed in Section 2.1.
• Procedures for metonymy resolution usually do not take the discourse context of
metonymies into account. This is, by definition, true for studies that are intentionally
limited to the understanding of single utterances [1,4,18,24,32,53]. It is, nevertheless,
also true for systems that clearly aim at text understanding [30,40]. As metonymies
and different kinds of anaphors are dealt with separately, they cannot account for
the systematic interactions between these phenomena we have been arguing for in
Sections 2.2 and 4.1 (for an exception, cf. Harabagiu [29]).
• Most often the underlying parsing and semantic interpretation components operate
in a non-incremental way. Metonymy resolution then requires a complete syntactic
analysis of the entire utterance [4,24,29,30,32,40] and/or some kind of semantic
annotation or preprocessing [1,30,40]. The main exception here is the work by Dan
Fass [16–18].
• Few researchers provide an empirical evaluation of their metonymy resolution
procedures. Bouaud et al. [4] give some concrete data with respect to the over-all
semantic interpretation rate of their system, but do not supply specific data on the
correctness of metonymy resolution proper. A similar criticism applies to Stallard
[53]. A case study of the contribution of metonymy resolution to the task of reference
resolution was conducted by Harabagiu [29], building on our anaphora and metonymy
interaction model [38]. The data indicate that metonymies occur at a rate of 16.3% for
anaphoric nominal expressions. The precision (76%) and recall data (83%) reported
are hard to interpret but seem to indicate a success rate of the resolution of anaphora
based on previous metonymy resolution, not of metonymy resolution in general.
• The issue of knowledge base granularity is usually not recognized as an important
problem at all. An exception is the work by Bouaud et al. [4], though they do not
distinguish between problems arising from granularity and the analysis of metonymies
proper.
• Unlike our own efforts, some researchers have already successfully integrated the
resolution of metaphors into their approaches [18,32,40].
In the following, we supplement these general observations with discussions of specific
approaches to metonymy resolution.
TEAM. The TEAM system [24], a domain-independent natural language interface
to data base systems, can be considered as one of the earliest approaches that deals
with metonymy resolution in a computational setting. TEAM does not supply general
metonymic schemata (apart from the Name-for-Object schema). Instead, the knowl-
edge engineer who customizes TEAM to a particular domain decides whether specific
instances of concept names in the relation tables of the underlying databases may stand
metonymically for other specific concepts. So, given a data base for cars, a typical ques-
tion addressed to the knowledge engineer might be: “Will you be able to say Fords to
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mean cars whose car-manufacturer is Ford?” (example from Section 3.4.2 in [24]).
Only those specific concept pairs acknowledged by the knowledge engineer are allowed for
subsequent metonymic interpretation. With this domain-specific acquisition mode, highly
domain-dependent metonymies can be accounted for. However, just enumerating special
metonymies lacks generality and does not explain the phenomenon. Not surprisingly, the
TEAM system is unable to cope with any form of recursion or innovation in metonymy
use, as well as any effects due to the context in which an utterance is made.
Metonymy recognition is triggered in TEAM only upon the occurrence of syntactic
deviances (proper names occurring with an indefinite article) or SRVs. Within the
knowledge-based paradigm, the TEAM approach is unique in the sense that it explicitly
exploits syntactic deviances for metonymy recognition. How metonymy interpretation
is actually achieved, and how TEAM deals with ambiguous metonymic readings is,
unfortunately, not discussed.
met∗ and Metallel. The research of Dan Fass [16–18] constitutes one of the classics in
metonymy and metaphor resolution. The structure of his resolution algorithm is as follows:
After the syntactic component has detected a subject-verb, object-verb, or adjective-noun
construction, the MET* algorithm for conceptual interpretation is activated—hence, we
are dealing here with an incremental method of metonymy interpretation. The conceptual
correlates of the lexical items encountered (so-called sense frames) are tried for conceptual
relatability. The system, first, tries to find a literal interpretation that obeys all required
conceptual constraints. Only if no such reading can be determined, metonymy resolution
is triggered. Hence, the resolution of metonymies is made dependent on the recognition of
SRVs. Their range is highly constrained, since only selectional restrictions of subjects and
objects for verbs and noun-modifying adjectives are taken into consideration. Furthermore,
possible problems of an incremental approach such as those resulting from indirect
semantic violations are discussed but not covered by the algorithm (see Section 6 in
[17]). Metonymy interpretation attempts to repair SRVs by (possibly recursively) applying
metonymic inference rules (corresponding to what we call metonymic schemata). If
the violations cannot be remedied by assuming a schematized metonymy, metaphor
interpretation takes over. Therefore non-schematized metonymies are disregarded.
The METALLEL system [32] extends MET* by incorporating metonymies and metaphors
indicated by indirect semantic violations. The intention is to generate a globally coherent
interpretation of the entire utterance on the basis of conceptual interpretations of indi-
vidual syntactic relationships, which have paths in the corresponding knowledge base as
their semantic counterparts. This approach diverges from Fass’s original work in two ways.
First, the incrementality of MET* is sacrificed in favor of parallel local computations (in-
terpretations of syntactic relationships), whose mutual combinability gets evaluated in a
subsequent interpretation step at the end of the utterance, i.e., no local disambiguations
occur. Second, the (direct) SRV hypothesis is abandoned. All local literal, metonymic and
metaphoric interpretations are computed in parallel and distinguished via different path
patterns.
While the latter property of the METALLEL system is similar to our approach, there are
nonetheless considerable differences regarding tractability and disambiguation strategies.
In the spreading-activation-based path search algorithm [32] propose, almost no search
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restrictions (apart from syntactic preferences) are incorporated. Furthermore, some specific
concept pairs are manually excluded from being metonymic for each other (see p. 488 in
[32], where the authors also concede that this approach “can at times seem arbitrary”). In
addition, pursual of subsumption relations with unconditioned specialization is granted.
Thus, in the case of metaphor they discuss (cf. Example (24)), a path between CAR and
DRINK is computed, which (in a longer form) expresses the following relations (other paths
including the correct one are found as well): CAR is a subconcept of PHYSICAL-OBJECT,
which is, in turn, a superconcept of ANIMAL, which can be an Agent of DRINKing. While
one might already call in question the prima facie plausibility of such a path pattern, what
is really strange is that the distinction criteria [32] propose for such path patterns lead
them to claim that this reading is actually a literal one. Since postulating the existence of a
literal reading is contrary to semantic evidence, we think that their path patterns might not
be restrictive enough.
(24) “The car drank gasoline.”
The disambiguation between alternative readings depends on similarity considerations
of the determined paths with already existing knowledge structures in the underlying
knowledge base (so-called grounding). The criteria which lead to grounding are not made
fully explicit. In the above example, both the described literal and the correct metaphorical
path license grounding (the authors argue, p. 486), which leads us to suspect that grounding
is not a very restrictive disambiguation method. Additional ad hoc measures (such as
path length considerations) are introduced for disambiguation purposes. Thus, in Example
(24) the literal reading is eventually discarded because its path length is ‘9’, whereas the
metaphoric one has length ‘8’. This method is, however, highly dependent on knowledge
base granularity.
Conceptual graphs. Inspired by early work of John Sowa [51], several procedures for
metonymy interpretation have been proposed within the Conceptual Graph approach, e.g.,
Amghar et al. [1], whose approach is very similar to Fass’s approach. We here focus on
the one developed within the MENELAS project [4], basically a syntax-first approach—the
parsing component produces a syntactic parse tree which gets transformed into a Concep-
tual Graph tree during semantic interpretation. The replacement of syntactic relations by
conceptual ones relies on computations of a path search algorithm, which distinguishes
between so-called Concept Fusion, Concept Inclusion and Model Join paths. The latter
include cases of metonymy, although they are not systematically distinguished from other
paths in Model Join. Search criteria for paths incorporate syntactic preferences and a pref-
erence for conceptual specificity in the identified paths. Disambiguation seemingly relies
upon disregarding metonymic paths when paths like Concept Fusion or Concept Inclusion
(corresponding approximately to literal paths) exist (hence, an SRV approach is adopted).
Disambiguation is extended by grammatical preferences and path length conditions. Un-
like other researchers, Bouaud et al. [4] are aware of granularity effects on metonymy
resolution rooted in the encoding of particular knowledge bases. They do not distinguish,
however, granularity phenomena from metonymies in their algorithmic schema.
Faustus. The FAUSTUS system focuses on inference-based text understanding [39,40],
its inferencing mode being based on marker passing. Marker collisions indicate possible
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inferences. The six different inference types being proposed include reference resolution
and the so-called view application, which is crucial for the analysis of metonymies and
metaphors (therefore handling a wider range of problems than we do here). The different
inference types are distinguished by formal path patterns (mainly distinguishing between
subsumption links and other relations), which direct the search through the underlying
semantic network. Although Norvig argues passionately for the use of path patterns
(instead of marker energy) to guide the search in a knowledge base, the definitions
of path patterns he gives are not restrictive enough. Additional rules for coping with
combinatorial search problems (e.g., an antipromiscuity rule excluding a path passing
concepts that subsume too many concepts) still have to be supplied and the choice of
particular numerical thresholds to cut off computation processes is not made explicit. The
path patterns we propose are complemented by structural criteria which do not rely upon
numerical restrictions in any way. The cyclicity criterion (Definition 3.3), e.g., increases
the degree of path length (and thus granularity) independence of the search procedure.
Norvig exploits two criteria for the resolution of metonymies. First, the concepts in-
volved must be related by one of the specific, prespecified view links, corresponding ap-
proximately to schemata. This obviously prevents FAUSTUS from dealing with innovative
metonymies. Second, a figurative interpretation is only triggered when an SRV has been
identified [40, p. 609f.]. After all possible inferences have been computed their assessment
is started in order to determine the most plausible one. This evaluation process is internal
to each particular type of inference, e.g., choosing amongst all possible figurative inter-
pretations of a word or between all possible antecedents of an anaphor. This precludes an
analysis of utterances where, e.g., anaphoric and metonymic readings interact with each
other, or only an inference of one type (e.g., a metonymic reading) allows to draw an in-
ference of another type (e.g., an anaphoric reading).
Tacitus. The TACITUS text understanding system [30] determines a logical representa-
tion for natural language input and then proves this representation via abductive reasoning.
Reasoning by abduction tries to generate the “best” explanation relative to what is a pri-
ori known in the underlying knowledge base. Hence, different interpretations or proofs,
including those that derive from metonymy resolution, usually compete for being superior.
The best explanation is always achieved by a proof that requires the least effort, the mini-
mal proof. The expenditures for a proof are measured in terms of a cost model, assigning
each single proof step a numerical cost factor.
The encoding of the logical representations in TACITUS allow literal language to be
considered a special case of metonymic language. However, as metonymy is not the main
emphasis of the approach, it is handled in a fairly restrictive manner: metonymy resolution
is only triggered when a semantic violation has been identified [30, p. 79]. 27 In addition,
metonymy resolution is limited to a set of specific relations, e.g., of the Part-of type.
In addition, metonymy resolution in TACITUS does not take the discourse context
into account. In effect, TACITUS implements a clear priority regime such that reference
resolution always precedes metonymy resolution [30, p. 128], which precludes referential
27 The range of violations being covered is not made explicit in the article. From the richness of the logical
representation used one may assume that, at least, all direct SRVs are covered.
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metonymic anaphors from being resolved at all (they require metonymy resolution to
precede anaphora resolution, cf. Section 4.1).
It is interesting to explore in what respect the SRV assumption is inherent in the
approach and the principles of its cost model. As an example, consider the principle
of Factoring, which targets at redundancies in the logical form. In a sentence such as
“(I) liked the laser” a Patient of “like” has to be proved and the existence of an object
of the type “laser” has to be proved, as well. Factoring states that it is less costly to
assume these two objects to be identical (as no type conflict occurs) and only prove the
existence of one of them. Therefore, a metonymy is never under consideration, if the actual
argument already fulfils the selectional restrictions imposed by the predicate. Otherwise,
the existence of the argument and the one of a non-identical underlying referent had to
be proved. Factoring is not explicitly applied to an example of metonymy resolution in
the paper, but is stated as a general, overall principle—our reasoning that applies it to
metonymy resolution seems to show that it might be too restrictive for some inference
types. We do not doubt the general usefulness of the abduction principle for metonymy
resolution but rather focus on inadequate minimality principles for choosing amongst
alternative abductive proofs.
WordNet. All the approaches discussed up to now use a conceptually rich knowledge
base with limited coverage. An interesting idea to pursue is the use of large-scale lexico-
semantic repositories for metonymy interpretation. Sanda Harabagiu [29] has developed a
methodology for deriving metonymic coercions from WORDNET that combines its lexico-
semantic relations with semantic information derived from conceptual definitions (the
WORDNET glosses). Three phases are distinguished: (1) the approximation of selectional
restrictions that need to be satisfied during the interpretation of nominal expressions, (2)
the retrieval of related knowledge that complies with the identified selectional restrictions,
(3) the validation of metonymic expressions against anaphoric ones from the sentence
following the processed sentence. The first two phases rely on knowledge extracted from
WORDNET and its automatic translation into a logical representation structure. In phase
(2), a search through the WORDNET database is conducted that checks all retrievable
synonyms, hypernyms and genera (in glosses) of nouns that can be related to the particular
syntactic role of the currently considered verb. If the search succeeds, a literal reading
for the noun under scrutiny is encountered. Metonymic readings are identified, if a literal
one is not possible and if a relation pattern can be found that incorporates at least
one occurrence of is-part, is-member or is-stuff. Hence, this work follows a strict SRV
approach.
Harabagiu replicates our main claim related to the discourse embedding of metonymy
resolution (based on an earlier version in [38]) by additional empirical data. The case study
for validating her approach was conducted within the coreference task for the MUC-
7 competition. A brief evaluation is reported that is based on the analysis of twenty
NYT articles. Harabagiu’s data indicate that 23% from 1261 nominal expressions in these
documents are anaphoric, with literal meaning assigned to 74.1% and metonymic readings
assigned to 16.8% of these anaphors. The contribution of metonymy resolution to the task
of reference resolution is on the order of 16.3%.
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6.2. Lexicon-based approaches to metonymy interpretation
There are reasonable arguments that a purely conceptual account of metonymies might
not be fully adequate. Firstly, knowledge-based inference types (often incorporating
metonymic schemata) are often semi-productive [13]. Let us consider productivity as
the ratio of the number of lexical items to which a schema is applicable, in principle,
and the number of lexical items the schemata is actually applied to [5,11]. Then, e.g.,
the Producer-for-Product schema is highly productive as almost all names of
producers can stand for one of their products. This is certainly not true for Part-for-
Whole metonymies (see also Section 2.3). Many of these “gaps” in the exploitation of
schemata do not easily fit a conceptual constraint model but are instead language-specific.
Nunberg [42], e.g., notes that whole subdomains can be excluded from schemata and that
these excluded domains vary from language to language for the same schema. We already
noted in Section 2.3 schema exceptions due to “blocking” [7]. Secondly, interactions of
metonymic readings with morphological properties of the lexical item or its phrasal context
also occur. So, we may encounter a metonymic use of a lexical item with the definite article,
while the metonymic use with another determiner is precluded as illustrated by an example
of a logical metonymy taken from Verspoor [59]:
(25) “John began the cheese” versus *“John began some cheese.”
Other forms of interaction are changes in the use of the article or the plural (e.g., the
indefinite article or plural may indicate a metonymic interpretation of a proper name as in
“a Quantum” or “two BMWs” [3]), or changes in countability (e.g., “I like wine” versus
“I like a wine” [12]). Interactions of this sort are especially frequent for conventional
metonymies.
These examples stress the relevance of linguistic criteria as an additional set of
constraints. Nevertheless, we rank these constraints as secondary and as supplementing
the primary conceptual ones, since the main prerequisite for understanding a metonymic
utterance is always the determination of a conceptual/semantic relation between the
items involved, no matter whether we are dealing with conventionalized or innovative
metonymies (cf. also Nunberg [42, p. 119] for supporting this view). A conceptual
approach provides the adequate representational setting for the formulation of the major
operational and pragmatic principles underlying metonymies. It allows us to formulate
language-independent constraints to explain and resolve metonymies. Postulating a
language-independent representation level for the basic regularities underlying metonymy
interpretation has also a relieving effect on the lexicon, which then houses the language-
dependent rules or even entirely idiosyncratic exceptions (as cases of blocking). This way,
a clear division of the workload is achieved. In addition, some aspects of semi-productivity
can be explained by conceptual aptness conditions [25]. Nunberg [41] also introduces a
pragmatic criterion for assessing the plausibility of a metonymic reading that bears some
resemblance to the uniqueness condition discussed by Hahn and Markert [25].
In the following, we will discuss the dominating lexicon-based approach in more
detail, viz. Pustejovsky’s generative lexicon [44–47]. Related lexical approaches by other
researchers, especially by Copestake, Briscoe and Lascarides, which share the fundamental
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idea of working with a lexicon enhanced with semantic roles, will be discussed as far as
they offer extensions interesting for metonymy resolution.
In a generative lexicon, lexical entries not only contain morphosyntactic features but
are organized in type hierarchies and are composed of qualia structures, which specify
four aspects of their meaning: the relation between the lexical entry and its constituent
parts (the constitutive role), that which distinguishes it within a larger domain, its physical
characteristics (the formal role), its purpose and function (the telic role), and whatever
brings it about (its agentive role) [44, p. 418]. So, the qualia structure for a novel specifies
that it has the purpose of being read (in the telic role) and that it comes about by writing
(in the agentive role).
Lexical rules (corresponding to schemata) allow the generation of metonymic meanings
of a lexical item based on its roles in the qualia structure. If a metonymy is encountered
such as in Example (15) (rephrased below as Example (26)), the qualia structure (especially
the telic and agentive role) of the lexical entry “novel” is checked for substituting “novel”
such that it fit the requirements by the verb “began”. Substitutions of this kind may lead
to an ambiguous replacement of the form “John began reading the novel” relating to
information from its telic role, or “John began writing the novel” relating to information
from its agentive role.
(26) “John began the novel.”
So far, this approach shares a lot of similarities with a knowledge-based approach:
Metonymic readings are not enumerated, but derived from a canonical representation
structure (here contained in the lexicon, in our approach in the knowledge base) via a
search procedure (here operating on the qualia structures in the lexicon, in our approach
on the concepts and their relations in the knowledge base). Fundamental differences
to our approach are considered below. Some are due to a lexicon-based approach
and a focus on restricting overgeneration, which sets them apart from all knowledge-
based approaches, in general; others, especially the lack of discourse integration and
the restriction to metonymies violating SRVs, set them apart from our approach, in
particular.
1. The focus of most lexicon-based approaches to metonymy interpretation is on
declarative specification issues (lexicon and rule design), usually without a deeper
concern for processing considerations. With the exception of Verspoor [58] and
Lascarides and Copestake [37], no algorithms are presented for sentence or text
analysis, which account for metonymic phenomena.
2. Rule ordering and the disambiguation between literal and metonymic or several
metonymic readings are dealt with only sketchily in many approaches. This holds
especially for the original work by Pustejovsky:
“It is not the role of a lexical semantic theory to say what readings are preferred,
but rather which are available.” (Pustejovsky [44, p. 430])
In most papers, only one criterion for rule application and disambiguation is
mentioned, namely that metonymic readings should only be generated if the literal
one violates syntactic constraints or exhibits SRVs (cf., e.g., Pustejovsky [44, p. 425]
192 K. Markert, U. Hahn / Artificial Intelligence 135 (2002) 145–198
or Copestake and Briscoe [12, p. 117]). Therefore, they suffer from all the problems
brought up in Section 2.1.
3. An interesting proposal for dealing with the problem of productivity of lexical rules,
which, if realized for metonymies, has also consequences for disambiguation and
rule application is due to Briscoe and Copestake [5]. They propose the use of
probabilistic lexical rules in order to estimate the probability of single derivable
meanings of a lexical item based on relative frequencies of these meanings in a given
text corpus. More frequent meanings of a lexical item are then preferred over less
frequent ones, if the more frequent ones do not violate intrasentential constraints.
Since the literal meaning might not necessarily be the most frequent one, metonymic
readings can then be preferred over literal ones. Also, more productive lexical rules
are preferred over less productive ones, leading to a disambiguation strategy for
several metonymic readings. In addition, this model easily incorporates cases of
morphological blocking, since “blocked” meanings do not or only rarely occur in
the corpus. Though compelling from a methodological point of view, Briscoe and
Copestake’s work suffers from a lack of evaluation and we are not aware that it
has been applied to metonymy resolution in practice up to now. Furthermore, the
proposed probability criterion takes only the a priori frequency of single lexical items
into account and disregards contextual factors.
4. Most of the research concentrates on conventional metonymies, since they can be
reconstructed by recourse to the qualia structures. Innovative metonymies can there-
fore usually not be handled. 28 Briscoe et al. [6] and Lascarides and Copestake [37],
however, note that discourse considerations may overrule conventional metonymic
readings originating from the lexical component. Consider the following example,
adapted from Lascarides and Copestake [37]:
(27) “John is my pet goat. He loves eating things. He enjoyed the book.”
In this case the writing/reading interpretation derived from the qualia structure
of “book” should be discarded in favor of the eating reading. Verspoor [58] and
Lascarides and Copestake [37] present an algorithm to deal with such phenomena for
logical metonymies. After discovering a syntactic or semantic constraint violation the
conventional reading/writing metonymic reading is derived from the lexicon. After
anaphora resolution (he = John, the goat), the writing/reading assumption is void,
since goats cannot read or write. The eating hypothesis is then strongly supported
by the discourse context, allowing cohesion by establishing a rhetorical relation [36],
whereas other hypotheses only lead to what the authors call “weak” coherence. While
favoring one reading over another on account of its support for discourse coherence
is similar to our approach, many differences remain:
• Metonymy resolution in Verspoor [58] and Lascarides and Copestake [37] builds
on a logical representation of the entire utterance. Hence, it is non-incremental.
28 Verspoor [59] and Briscoe et al. [6] give data for logical metonymies indicating that conventional metonymies
are much more frequent than innovative ones, so that the coverage for logical metonymies, at least, is not greatly
impaired by not covering innovative metonymies.
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• The resolution of metonymies in Verspoor [58] and Lascarides and Copestake [37]
is still dependent on SRVs or syntactic violations. Discourse criteria only come
into play for choosing among different metonymic readings, not between literal
and metonymic one(s). Metonymies whose recognition is fully dependent on the
discourse context cannot be treated this way.
• The interaction mode we have outlined above relates to metonymies and rhetorical
relations, not to metonymies and anaphors, thereby making the two approaches
complementary. This is evident from the observation that the recognition of the
innovative metonymy in Example (27) requires anaphora resolution between “he”
and “John” to precede metonymy interpretation. Referential metonymic anaphors
that require metonymy resolution prior to anaphor resolution, therefore, are not
handled by this approach.
• This approach is restricted to logical metonymies and some similar metonymies
within adjective-noun constructions. Whereas the interaction between anaphora
and metonymies that we use is very frequent (see Section 5.1) metonymies such
as Example (27) are very rare—so only 4.9% of the logical metonymies in the
BNC by the verb “begin” are determined by the context [59]. As we, on the
other hand, cannot handle logical metonymies, the two approaches are—again—
complementary.
5. A major concern of lexicon-based approaches are specifications intended to prevent
overgeneration by systematically constraining lexical rules, an issue almost neglected
in knowledge-based approaches. Single studies then deal with very specific lexical
examples in a very detailed way, often at the price of a reasonable coverage and
methodological generalization. For instance, Godard and Jayer [23] discuss various
constraints on logical metonymies for the French verb “commencer”, Pustejovsky
and Bouillon [47] consider aspectual verbs and their associated restrictions on logical
metonymies.
We, finally, recognize a fundamental difference of research goals for both approaches
rendering them complementary. Lexicon-based approaches aim primarlily at questions of
the organization of the lexicon, the representation of lexical rules and language-specific
constraints they are associated with. The focus of knowledge-based approaches, ours in
particular, is more on adequacy criteria for metonymies that are grounded in discourse or
domain knowledge. The latter are much coarser than the constraints provided for lexicons
but they are far more general. Hence, we may refine these specifications by lexically
based ones in order to add discriminative power to the constraint system underlying our
metonymy resolution process.
7. Conclusions and outlook
We have presented an approach to metonymy resolution that is rooted in conceptual
representation structures of a domain knowledge base. From a processing perspective, we
do not consider literal language as being prioritized relative to (conventional) figurative
language. Rather we propose a computation model in which literal and metonymic readings
are determined independently of each other. Thus, metonymic readings need not violate
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semantic restrictions in order to be computed at all. Another major aspect of our work
concerns the incorporation of the discourse context, in particular, the heavy interaction
of metonymies and anaphors. These two design decisions together extend the coverage
of metonymies by about 15% for anaphoric metonymies as well as increase the anaphora
resolution capacity on the order of about 16%. In addition, they allow metonymy resolution
to be incorporated into an incremental processing model (as well as into a serial one)
without an excessive need for backtracking on the one hand or an excessive proliferation
of ambiguities on the other hand.
Despite its increased coverage our approach still has problems with two kinds of
metonymies. Firstly, it cannot recognise non-anaphoric metonymies without SRVs (see
Example (3)). In these cases we are able to compute literal as well as metonymic readings
via the Path Finder but our disambiguation strategy then follows the line common to
previous approaches, namely of discarding the metonymic interpretation. Our evaluation
has shown this to be wrong in many cases (e.g., 7 (25%) of 28 non-definite metonymies
in our data were not marked by an SRV). Non-definite metonymic noun phrases without
SRVs seem to be substantially different, though, from the definite metonymic noun phrases
without SRVs. Whereas the definite ones were mostly anaphoric and therefore recognis-
able by incorporating discourse constraints, the non-definite ones mostly require extensive
pragmatic reasoning (see p. 38), so that our disambiguation method cannot be readily ex-
tended towards non-definite metonymies.
Secondly, our algorithm cannot handle cases of metonymies where syntactic or
morphological analysis already fails, e.g., variants of logical metonymy. In those cases
the semantic interpretation mechanism including metonymy resolution is not triggered,
although semantic interpretation as such is not precluded from handling such phenomena.
This problem needs a refinement of the language-oriented specifications of our system, viz.
the grammar and lexicon, not of the conceptual and semantic mechanisms we have detailed
in this paper. Thus we should also trigger metonymy interpretation in some specific cases
of failure of the syntactic analysis. Obviously this class of phenomena has to be defined
very restrictively as syntactic analysis is an important filter before conceptual interpretation
in most cases. We suggest the following cases:
• Syntactic linkage between a number of verbs, e.g., “begin, enjoy, finish” and their
direct objects, if these are nouns.
• Some morphological phenomena, e.g., the plural of proper names that are normally
restricted to the singular (“2 BMWs”).
In theory, disregarding language-specific metonymy constraints can also lead to
overgeneration as, e.g., cases of blocking cannot be recognised. In practice, this has not
been a problem and we have actually not encountered any case in our text analysis yet,
where we produced a metonymic interpretation, which should not be licensed because
of language-specific properties. 29 We expect this is due to the fact that we deal with the
analysis of natural language texts, which normally do not contain non-licensed metonymies
anyway. The problem is probably much more serious for natural language generation.
29 We have of course had cases of false positives. But these were mainly due to overgeneration in the case of
bridging phenomena, not to language-specific idiosyncracies (see Section 4).
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Regarding evaluation, our approach has been evaluated by empirical data on a limited
scale. Further work on annotation schemes for metonymies is badly needed to run
evaluations on a larger scale. Ideally, one might want to set up ‘metonymy banks’ similar to
parse tree banks—nothing like that exists so far, leading to a lack of principled evaluations
for metonymy resolution. The authors are at the moment extracting such a metonymy bank
from the British National Corpus.
Regarding prerequisites, rich knowledge structures—concepts and their conceptual
relations—are needed for successful metonymy resolution. While our resolution mecha-
nism does not depend on the relation hierarchies we introduced into our work, there is
some dependence on the granularity of the knowledge base. We tried to minimize granular-
ity issues by several abstraction mechanisms. While the quest for rich domain knowledge
is certainly a bottleneck from a knowledge engineering view, it does not constitute a princi-
pled argument against our approach when compared with lexicon-oriented work. The spec-
ification of sufficiently expressive qualia structures is likely to consume the same amount
of work than that required for the specification of knowledge bases. Less work is faced
when one commits to shallower knowledge sources such as WORDNET. In such a case,
however, constraint knowledge is much more restricted, though the lexical coverage is in-
creased. Even a ‘knowledge-free’ approach to metonymy resolution can be thought of, with
no costs involved to build up a knowledge base. Thus, Utiyama et al. [57] propose a sta-
tistical approach for Japanese metonymy interpretation, which is based on co-occurrence
data from a Japanese corpus. However, it is hard to compare their results with ours because
of three reasons. Firstly, their approach is evaluated on textbook examples only—the eval-
uation is also flawed as the authors count an interpretation as correct, if “it makes sense in
some context”. Thus, for the metonymy “Dave drank the glasses” they count the reading
“Dave drank coke” as correct, although it is clearly overspecific and may be inconsistent
with the discourse context in real-world texts. The necessary abstraction processes to a
reading like “Dave drank the liquid in the glasses”, would probably again involve at least
a semantic hierarchy. It is in addition not clear how well the method works in context.
Secondly, the authors handle subject-verb and verb-object combinations only, exhibiting
SRVs and verbs which put fairly strong selectional restrictions on their objects/subjects.
Thus, the very problems we address (discourse-specific readings and metonymies without
direct violations) are excluded. Thirdly, the authors do not handle metonymy recognition
yet, which they take to be the harder problem (Utiyama, p.c.).
Regarding usability in different system contexts, our algorithm profits from its inherent
modularity (see also Section 4.3 for the algorithm description). It is not necessary to
subscribe entirely to the various decisions we have been arguing for. The algorithm
structure makes no prescriptions related to the format and structure of the background
knowledge or the particular discourse theory for determining anaphoric relationships
although we have made specific decisions for our version of the algorithm. So, it is
possible to determine literal and metonymic readings by using lexical structures instead
of knowledge-based ones or by using conceptual graphs instead of description logics and
then still use our disambiguation and discourse predicates on top of these.
An interesting question is how far our algorithm can be applied to other figurative lan-
guage phenomena, notably metaphor. The computation of metaphoric readings is inher-
ently different from the computation of metonymic readings as metaphor relies more on
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similarities between two concepts or instances than on other relationships between them
as computed by the Path Finder. In addition, it is more often than metonymy not
only a local phenomenon but spans a whole utterance. Thus, our model of computation
cannot easily be transferred to metaphor resolution. We still have two contributions to
make regarding disambiguation. Firstly, our approach to disambiguation between literal
and metonymic language can be adopted in a straightforward way to referring metaphoric
noun phrases (e.g., referring to a man as “the lion”). Here, also, a metaphoric reading al-
lowing for anaphora resolution might be preferrable over a literal reading not allowing for
anaphora resolution. Secondly, the Principle of Referential Success might also give clues
for the disambiguation between metonymic and metaphoric readings. Thus, in Example (7)
a metonymic reading of the noun shirt competes with a metaphoric reading of the verb wait
(interpreting the noun literally at the same time). As the latter reading allows for anaphora
resolution whereas the former does not, a metaphoric reading of the verb can be preferred.
Incorporating this principle is in contrast to the work of Fass [18] who seemingly prefers
metonymic readings strictly over metaphoric ones, leading to problems in the example
mentioned.
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